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MORE PROCESS THAN PEACE: 
LEGITIMACY, COMPLIANCE, AND THE 
OSLO ACCORDS 
Orde F. Kittrie* 
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND THE 
LESSONS OF FAIL URE - PERSPECTIVES, PREDICAMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS. Edited by Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma'oz, and Khalil 
Shikaki. Portland: Sussex Academic Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 174. $67.50. 
BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: How GREAT 
NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD 
WAR CONFLICTS. A PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM ON 
NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL. By Michael Watkins and 
Susan Rosegrant. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2001. Pp. xxii, 346. $40. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
The 21st century has inherited a number of bloody and long­
unresolved intranational conflicts,1 including those in Kashmir, 
* The author, Orde F. Kittrie, is a Washington, D.C. attorney. B.A. 1986, Yale; J.D. 
1992, University of Michigan. - Ed. The author of this Review wishes to thank the follow­
ing for their helpful comments: Robert Dalton, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Af­
fairs at the United States Department of State; Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director of the 
Middle East Program at the United States Institute of Pe'ace; Joel Singer, the former Legal 
Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry; Emory University Professor Kenneth Stein, formerly 
director of the Carter Center; and Debra Feuer. The views expressed herein are the author's 
own, and not necessarily those of either his employer or the U.S. Government. 
1. PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF­
DETERMINAT!ON MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) is a particularly useful survey of 
the world's armed conflicts, both those which are intranational or "societal," and those 
which are international. Published in January 2003 by the University of Maryland's Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management, Peace and Conflict states that 
there were twelve "ongoing major societal wars" at the end of 2002: Russia-Chechens, Co­
lombia, Algeria, Israel-Palestinians, Nepal, India-Kashmiri Muslims, Philippines-Moro Mus­
lims, Burundi-Hutus, Sudan-Southerners, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, and Liberia. Id. at 
12. It lists eleven additional "societal wars [which] were experiencing sporadic outbursts of 
violence at the end of 2002." Id. at 13. Interestingly, it also notes that "(t]he 1990 Iraq inva­
sion of Kuwait and the subsequent 1991 U.S.-led Gulf War to expel the invaders is the only 
ambiguous interstate war during the post-Cold War era." Id. (The report was published 
before the beginning of the 2003 U.S.-Jed invasion of Iraq.) 
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Northern Ireland, Burundi, Cyprus, Colombia, the Congo, the 
Philippines, and the Holy Land.2 Negotiated . efforts to resolve these 
conflicts through legally binding peace settlements have been 
attempted from time to time, but without lasting success. 
Numerous negotiators' memoirs, political science books, and histo­
rians' tomes have been devoted to the subject of peace negotiations. 
But relatively little has been written about peace negotiations from a 
legal perspective. In particular, the legal literature contains virtually 
no discussion of what in the contents of a bilateral peace agreement's 
text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will comply with the 
peace agreement's terms. 
There is a recent body of international legal scholarship that seeks 
to identify those characteristics of a multilateral agreement that can 
enhance the likelihood that parties will comply with the agreement. 
The primary focus of such international legal "compliance scholar­
ship" has been on nonbinding agreements in "global issue" areas such 
as environmental protection. This Review expands compliance schol­
arship from the multilateral into the bilateral realm, and from global 
issues into the regional-conflict arena. 
The foremost bilateral peacemaking effort of the last decade has 
been the attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the 
Oslo Peace Accords.3 Drawing from three key recent books, this 
Review uses the Accords as a case study. From this case study, it 
derives broader lessons about what in the contents of a bilateral peace 
agreement's text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood 
that the parties will comply with the peace agreement's terms. 
2. It is worth noting that most if not all of these protracted intranational conflicts are, 
like the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, about "the redefinition of territory, state formation, or 
control of the state" and are marked by ''long-standing animosities rooted in a perceived 
threat to identity or survival." JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE 
RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 8, 17 (1997). Lederach notes that in such conflicts, 
"contested issues of substance (such as territory or governance) are intimately rooted in the 
cultural and psychological elements driving and sustaining the conflict." Id. at 17. At the 
same time, "the futures of those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and 
interdependent." Id. at 27. The similarities between these intranational conflicts mean that 
lessons derived from the Oslo process seem especially likely to apply to peacemaking with 
respect to the other intranational conflicts. This Review will, however, refer to "peacemak­
ing" as opposed to "peacemaking with respect to intranational conflicts" because it is this 
author's belief that the lessons this Review discusses are likely also to be applicable to proc­
esses and mechanisms for resolving most armed conflicts between states. 
3. The first agreement that the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization ("PLO") signed was the Arafat-Rabin exchange of mutual-recognition letters 
on September 9, 1993. Four days later, on the White House lawn, they signed the Declara­
tion of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("DOP"), which had been ne­
gotiated and initialed in Oslo, Norway. The terms "Oslo Accords" or "Accords," as used in 
this Review, includes the Arafat-Rabin letters of September 9, 1993, the DOP, and all sub­
sequent written agreements between the Government of Israel and the PLO. The key such 
agreements are listed in Part II of this Review. 
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Drawing examples from the Accords, this Review will first survey 
the broad range of valuable contributions that international law can 
make to successful peace negotiations, and in particularly to the 
drafting of a compliance-friendly, lasting peace agreement. These con­
tributions include 1) supplying norms that can bind the peace negotia­
tions and the resulting agreement, 2) offering dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, 3) lending legitimacy to the process and to the text, and 
4) providing building blocks for the construction of the peace process 
and the final agreement. This Review will discuss why and how the 
Oslo process and texts failed to take advantage of most of these poten­
tial contributions. 
The Review will then focus on the deleterious role of the two 
methodological pillars on which the Oslo negotiators did attempt to 
rely: a) "open-ended gradualism" and b) "constructive ambiguity". As 
this Review will discuss, the Accords were "open-ended" in that they 
left almost completely open the fundamental question of what the 
permanent status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians 
would eventually entail. The Accords' framers instead relied on the 
two parties gradually making concessions towards each other on the 
assumption that over time confidence and trust would grow, making 
difficult issues easier to resolve. The Accords' texts also contained a 
considerable amount of "constructive ambiguity" - papering over 
disagreements by using ambiguous phrases capable of being inter­
preted by each of the parties in a manner protective of their own 
interests or positions. 
The Review will discuss why the drafters of the Oslo Accords 
chose to rely so heavily on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity in 
their efforts to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final 
settlement. It will then analyze how and why this reliance proved to be 
disastrously counterproductive. The Review concludes with a discus­
sion of lessons learned, including lessons specifically applicable to 
future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and lessons generally applica­
ble to designing peace negotiations, and peace agreement texts to 
maximize compliance with their te'rins. 
B. Introduction to the Literature 
The columnist Charles Krauthammer has memorably summarized 
the lessons he and many others draw from the bloody state of the Oslo 
peace process: 
The great divide in American foreign policy thinking is between those 
who believe in paper and those who believe in power. The paper school 
was in charge of the 1990s. . . . The bloodiest farce was the Oslo 
'peace' . . . .  Living by paper - contracts and laws and courts and binding 
agreements - is lovely. It's what makes domestic society civilized and 
decent. The problem is that the international arena is not domestic soci-
1664 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1661 
ety. It is a jungle . . . .  Laboring over every jot and tittle - the life work of 
our paper-pushing peace processors - is quite mad. The beginning of 
wisdom is giving up this supremely na"ive belief in paper.4 
Krauthammer's are not words that international lawyers - who 
make a living laboring over international agreements - like to hear. 
Are Krauthammer and those who share his skepticism of peace 
agreements right? By now, more than ten years after the signing of the 
first Oslo Accord, much has been written about the political dynamics 
that contributed to Oslo's failure. As Part III of this Review discusses, 
there is a strong argument that the Oslo Accords were ultimately 
doomed to failure by Yasser Arafat 's fundamental unwillingness to 
end the conflict with Israel. But is the futility of peace agreements with 
Yasser Arafat the only lesson to be learned from the failure of the 
Oslo Accords? Does careful scrutiny reveal that there are also struc­
tural reasons why the Oslo Accords brought more process than peace? 
Were there flaws in the design of the agreements that also discouraged 
the parties from complying with them? What important lessons that 
are applicable to other conflicts can be learned from Oslo? How can 
we maximize the ability of international law and international agree­
ments to be useful tools for making peace in the international jungle? 
How can we use them to build sustainable processes and mechanisms 
capable of helping transform conflict into peace and reconciliation? 
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons 
of Failure ("Lessons of Failure") and Breakthrough International 
Negotiation ("Breakthrough") provide a useful starting point for in­
quiring into these critical questions. 
Lessons of Failure is thoughtfully edited by Robert L. Rothstein 
(an American who is the Harvey Picker Professor of International 
Relations at Colgate University), Moshe Ma'oz (an Israeli who is 
Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem), and Khalil Shikaki (a Palestinian who is an Associate 
Professor of Political Science at Bir Zeit University). It presents a 
broad range of political perspectives on the Oslo process, from left­
wing Israelis to an lslamist Palestinian who describes how "the very 
existence of 'Israel' is considered illegal" from an "Islamic point of 
view."5 The book makes for interesting reading, partly because each 
one of the commentators has a different view of what the Accords re­
quired and what the best way is to move forward. As this Review dis­
cusses, commentators across the spectrum, including those presented 
in f.-essons of Failure, do seem to agree on one very interesting thing: 
that at least part of the reason the Oslo process failed lies with the 
4. Charles Krauthammer, The Clinton Paper Chase, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at A29. 
5. Mustafa Abu Sway, Islamic Perspectives on the Oslo Process, in LESSONS OF 
FAILURE, p. 86. 
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structure and text of the Accords themselves, and especially their reli­
ance on open-ended gradualism and constructive ambiguity. 
Breakthrough was written by two Harvard faculty members, 
Michael Watkins6 and Susan Rosegrant,7 under the auspices of the 
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. It intersperses chap­
ters on international negotiation theory with chapters applying those 
theories to four major recent, international negotiations, including the 
Oslo process. The Oslo-specific chapters, as well as the chapters of 
general international negotiation theory, facilitate an analysis of Oslo 
in light of the latest theoretical wisdom about international negotia­
tions. 
As resources for determining Oslo's lessons, the political science 
perspectives of Lessons of Failure and the negotiating theory perspec­
tives of Breakthrough are nicely complemented by The Oslo Accords: 
International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements8 ("Oslo 
& International Law"), by Geoffrey R. Watson. Watson is a professor 
of law at Catholic University of America. Watson's is the rare book 
that approaches a peace negotiation from an international legal per­
spective. Oslo & International Law deftly parses the Accords' specific 
terms and assesses them in the context of broader international legal 
principles as well as other international agreements. Oslo & 
International Law is organized as answers to four major legal ques­
tions about the Oslo process: whether the Accords are legally binding; 
to what extent each side has complied with its obligations under the 
Accords; what effect violations have on each of the parties' outstand­
ing obligations; and how international law can help shape a final 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.9 Together, Lessons of 
Failure, Breakthrough, and Oslo & International Law provide valuable 
insight into why the Palestinians and the Israelis failed to comply with 
the Oslo Accords, what negotiating and drafting improvements could 
have maximized compliance with the Accords, and what contributions 
paper documents and indeed international law can make to the resolu­
tion of conflicts in the international jungle. 
Unfortunately, despite the excellent raw material they provide, 
none of these books has an organizational structure or analytical 
scheme that is particularly helpful for systematically assessing where 
the Oslo process failed in its use of international law to negotiate and 
create a sustainable peace. Each chapter of Lessons of Failure is writ­
ten by a different analyst; almost without exception, the chapters con-
6. Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School. 
7. Faculty Member, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
8. GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000). 
9. Id. at vii. 
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sist of that analyst's enumeration of all the key factors which he or she 
believes contributed to Oslo's failure. Breakthrough provides an out­
standing overview of relevant negotiations theory, and very useful 
insight into how the Israelis and Palestinians were coaxed into reach­
ing their first agreement in Oslo. But it contains almost no analysis of 
how the methods used to coax them at the beginning - including 
ambiguity, gradualism, and open-endedness - may have contributed 
to the eventual failure of the process begun at Oslo. The questions 
that Oslo & International Law addresses are important, and it is a 
generally superb book. But, as this Review will discuss, the book pro­
vides an inadequate, and indeed in many ways incorrect, assessment of 
what changes to the Oslo Accords could have maximized, and what in 
the Accords tended to diminish, the likelihood that the parties would 
comply with the Accords' terms. 
Rather than summarizing and analyzing each of these books in 
turn, this Review instead draws from them to assess systematically the 
Oslo process's use of international law to negotiate and create a 
sustainable peace. In examining the interplay between peacemaking, 
negotiations theory and practice, and international law, this Review 
ventures into relatively uncharted territory. As Kenneth W. Stein and 
Samuel W. Lewis pointed out ill their pre-Oslo book, Making Peace 
Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty Years of Negotiating 
Experience ("Making Peace"), "lessons from the history of U.S.-Arab­
lsraeli negotiations have rarely if ever been extracted and systemati­
cally applied."10 This gap in the literature is not limited to peace nego­
tiations between Arabs and Israelis. Remarkably little has been writ­
ten about how bilateral international agreements in general can be 
designed so as to maximize the likelihood that parties will comply with 
them.1 1 This is especially true of peace agreements, which some might 
consider as the most important and challenging form of bilateral 
international agreements. Indeed, Richard B .  Bilder's 1981 book, 
Managing the Risks of International Agreement, stands practically 
alone in serving as a practical guide to maximizing compliance with 
bilateral international agreements of any type. 
The lack of scholarship on using international law to negotiate and 
create sustainable peace processes and agreements is particularly 
notable with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While that 
conflict "has been waged primarily on political and military battle­
grounds . . .  a legal war has also raged on paper, and it has been as 
hard-fought as any of the Arab-Israeli wars."12 Even though the 
10. KENNETH W. STEIN & SAMUEL W. LEWIS, MAKING PEACE AMONG ARABS AND 
ISRAELIS: LESSONS FROM FIFrY YEARS OF NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE ix (1991). 
11. Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, United 
States Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2003). 
12. WATSON, supra note 8, at 1. 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict has manifested itself most saliently as a 
bloody struggle waged using bombs and bullets, both sides have, 
throughout the conflict, looked to international law to provide both 
justifications for their actions, and potential means of resolving their 
conflict. 
I. THE OSLO ACCORDS 
A. Introduction to the Accords 
The Arafat-Rabin exchange of mutual-recognition letters, signed 
on September 9, 1993, was the first of the Oslo Accords. In his letter, 
Yasser Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, confirmed that the PLO: "recognizes the right of the 
State of Israel to exist in peace and security;" "commits itself to . . .  a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares 
that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved 
through negotiations;" and "renounces the use of terrorism and other 
acts of violence. "13 Yitzhak Rabin, in his capacity as Prime Minister of 
Israel, replied to Arafat's letter with a letter in which Rabin confirmed 
that "in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the 
Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the repre­
sentative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with 
the PLO within the Middle East peace process."14 
Four days later, on September 13, 1993, the DOP was signed on 
the White House lawn. In the preamble, the Government of Israel and 
the PLO declared it their goal to "put an end to decades of confronta­
tion and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, 
and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and secu­
rity and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process."1 5  
The DOP was succeeded by the following major agreements be­
tween Israel and the PLO: the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area, signed on May 4, 1994;16  the Agreement on Preparatory 
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, signed on August 29, 1994;17 
the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
13. Letter from Arafat to Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 
315. 
14. Id. at 316. 
15. DOP Preamble (Sept. 13, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317-27. 
16. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (May 4, 1994), reprinted in 
WATSON, supra note 8, at 328-39. 
1 7. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Aug. 29, 1994), 
reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 340-48. 
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Gaza Strip, signed on September 28, 1995;18 the Protocol Concerning 
the Redeployment in Hebron, signed January 15, 1997;19 the Wye 
River Memorandum, signed on October 23, 1998;20 and the Sharm 
el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding 
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of 
Permanent Status Negotiations, signed on September 4, 1999.21 Some 
of these agreements included attachments, such as annexes, maps, 
agreed minutes, notes for the record, and the like. In total, the Oslo 
Accords add up to some one thousand pieces of paper.22 
The Oslo Accords provided for a five year transition period to 
begin with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, 
and to end with a "permanent settlement." Permanent-status negotia­
tions were to "commence as soon as possible, but not later than the 
beginning of the third year of the interim period."23 The transitional 
period began on May 4, 1994 and was to conclude on May 4, 1999. 
Although permanent-status negotiations did take place, including 
those at Camp David in July 2000, no permanent settlement was 
reached. 
The Oslo Accords were largely, if not entirely, a failure. The basic 
criterion for evaluating the value of any diplomatic instrument is the 
degree to which it helped to achieve its declared objective. In this 
instance, the declared objective was a "just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace settlement and historic reconciliation."24 By mid-2003, the 
decade since the September 1993 signing on the White House lawn 
had seen the renewal of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against 
Israel, hundreds of dead on both sides, the reoccupation of most of the 
West Bank, enormous damage to both the Israeli and Palestinian 
economies, and the missing of practically every Oslo deadline. Dennis 
Ross, the Special Middle East Coordinator who was the lead Ameri­
can negotiator with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 
Clinton Administration, wrote as follows at the end of 2002: 
In my 20 years involved in Middle East diplomacy, there have been many 
times when the effort toward peace appeared futile to the parties 
18. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept. 
28, 1 995), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 349-68. 
19. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (Jan. 15, 1997), reprinted in 
WATSON, supra note 8, at 369-74. 
20. Wye River Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1998), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 
377-84. 
21. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (Sept. 4, 1999), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, 
at 385-89. 
22. See, e.g.. AHARON KLEIMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST 
PEACE-MAKING 57 (1999). 
23. DOP Article V, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 318. 
24. DOP Preamble, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317. 
May 2003] More Process than Peace 1669 
involved. But none of those times had the ring of hopelessness that I see 
in the region today. It is clear that Israelis, after two years of violence, 
believe they have no partner for peace among the Palestinians. For their 
part, Palestinians question whether the current Israeli government has 
any plan other than to try to extinguish their aspirations through force.25 
In mid 2003, there was some hope that in the wake of Gulf War II, 
the Road Map process might succeed in picking up the pieces of Oslo 
and moving the parties toward peace. Such an effort to pick up Oslo's 
pieces makes it even more important to try to understand why Oslo 
fell apart in the first place. 
Many people believe that Oslo was doomed to failure because the 
Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was unwilling to make peace with 
Israel on any terms. This Review will briefly examine that possibility 
and its implications. But the Review will argue that, whether or not 
this was the case, major methodological flaws in the structure and text 
of the Oslo Accords also stood in the way of peace. In the course of 
this analysis, this Review will not focus on the substance of the 
Accords, or of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole. It will focus 
instead on the legal processes and methodologies used to build the 
Accords, and on what the failure of these methodologies meant for the 
outcome of the Accords. 
B. Introduction to the Methodology of the Accords 
Negotiation theory focuses on the critical role of process and 
methodology in determining the success of conflict resolution efforts 
(p. xiv). Drawing heavily on the classics in the field of conflict resolu­
tion, Breakthrough notes that, "Skilled negotiators think hard about 
the impact of process on perceptions of interests and alternatives, on 
the part of their counterparts and those they represent, and on their 
own side. Then they work to fashion - often to negotiate - processes 
likely to lead in favorable directions" (p. xviii). 
Part of what makes the Oslo Accords especially interesting from a 
methodological perspective is that they took an unusual - some have 
said "uniquely structured"26 - approach to trying to achieve their 
desired outcome. Joel Singer, the attorney who joined the Israeli team 
in Oslo and continued to serve as Israel's lawyer for the first several 
years of the Oslo process (including as the Legal Adviser to Israel's 
Foreign Ministry), has characterized this unusual approach as follows: 
Usually . . .  you agree on a general framework that includes the basic 
agreement of the parties on the fundamental elements of their dispute, 
leaving for later agreements all the details of the implementation of the 
25. Dennis Ross, Mapping Out Peace in the Mideast, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at B15. 
26. Joel Singer, Capitol Hill Briefing (Sept. 14, 1997), LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal 
News Service File. 
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basic framework agreement. The Oslo Agreement was uniquely struc­
tured in a reverse manner. It is full of details regarding the day to day 
administration of a five year transitional period, leaving open for a later 
agreement the most important question of the ultimate settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute.27 
Aaron Miller, the Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator during the 
Clinton Administration, has described the reason for this "reverse" of 
the normal methodological approach as follows: "The logic of Oslo 
was to defer for now issues that could not be resolved on the assump­
tion that over time confidence and trust . . .  would grow so that even 
while [an issue such as] Jerusalem could not be resolved in 1993, a 
solution could be worked out later."28 
"Traditional bargain theory" requires "a contract that provides for 
all contingencies and comprehensively specifies [all the details] of per­
formance. "29 By contrast, the Israelis and Palestinians developed at 
Oslo a declaration of principles that purposefully "guaranteed nothing 
about whether or how the central substantive issues would be re­
solved. "30 Instead, the DOP and its follow-on agreements created a le­
gally structured process designed to build trust. Central, substantive 
issues were to be tackled once trust had thus been built. 
Four specific methodologies characterized Oslo's trust-building 
process: 1) open-ended gradualism, 2) constructive ambiguity, 3) bilat­
eralism, and 4) reciprocity.31 As Terje Roed-Larsen, the Norwegian 
impresario of the Oslo talks, pointed out in an article on the ninth 
anniversary of the secret initialing of the DOP in Oslo, "the Oslo 
process used a few key tactics. One was gradualism - solving what 
was solvable, moving gradually forward and building trust along the 
way. Another was bilateralism - Israelis and Palestinians negotiated 
directly, with third party roles often confined to facilitation. "32 "Bilat­
eralism" can be defined as a focus on direct negotiations between the 
parties, with minimum reliance on third-party mediation. "Construc­
tive ambiguity" means the deliberate use of vague, equivocal, or 
ambiguous language capable of being interpreted by each party as 
protecting its own interests. "Reciprocity" is an emphasis on each 
27. Id. 
28. Aaron Miller, The Pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian Peace: A Retrospective, in LESSONS 
OF FAILURE, p. 34. 
29. Juliet P. Kpstritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A 
Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 623 (1993). 
30. Robert L. Rothstein, A Fragile Peace: Are There Only Lessons of Failure?, in 
LESSONS OF FAILURE, p. 163 [hereinafter Rothstein, Are There Only Lessons]. 
31.  This Reviewer's definitions of "open-ended gradualism" and "constructive ambigu­
ity" in the Oslo context are set forth in detail in the following Parts and Sections of this Re­
view: Overview; IV. Open-Ended Gradualism; and V. Constructive Ambiguity. 
32. Terje Roed-Larsen, This Time the World Has to Act, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 20, 
2002, at 6. 
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party's performance being conditioned on the other party's perform­
ance. 3  Larsen has characterized such confidence-building approaches 
as a special "kind of diplomacy . . .  the spirit of Oslo," a diplomacy 
emphasizing "the necessity of building . . .  confidence" and overcom­
ing "lack of trust. "34 
Professor Watson, in the conclusion of Oslo & International Law, 
refers to the positive value of these four methodologies as part of the 
"broader lessons" that the Oslo Accords "teach . . .  about the peaceful 
settlement of disputes."35 Watson posits "the value of vagueness 
and ambiguity,"36 "the value of gradualism,"37 "the importance of 
reciprocity,"38 and the "lesson . . .  that not every regional conflict re­
quires mediation."39 Drawing in large part on Lessons of Failure, 
Breakthrough, and Oslo & International Law, but at times also on 
other sources, this Review focuses mainly on two of these particular 
methodologies of the Oslo process - open-ended gradualism and 
ambiguity. It argues that among the most salient lessons of Oslo is the 
counterproductiveness of relying on open-ended gradualism and 
ambiguity as key elements of a peace process and agreement. 
International law can make several valuable types of contributions 
to a peace process. As this Review will discuss, the Accords' framers 
did not avail themselves of most of these potential positive contribu­
tions. That failure meant the Accords were, from the beginning, 
weaker than they could have been. The damage done by the Oslo 
Accords' misreliance on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity was 
particularly significant in part because of that congenital weakness. . 
The next Part of this Review surveys the broad range of valuable 
contributions that international law can make to peacemaking and dis­
cusses why and how the Oslo Accords failed to take advantage of most 
of them. Subsequent Parts focus on the reasons the negotiations relied 
heavily on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity, and the disastrous 
results of that reliance. 
II. PEACEMAKING AND INTERN A TI ON AL LAW 
" [I]nternational law can help bring about the dream of peace,"40 
writes Catholic University's Professor Watson in the preface to Oslo 
33. See WATSON, supra note 8, at 308-10. 
34. Oslo Plus Five - The Spirit of Oslo: Interview with Ambassador Terje Roed Larsen, 
MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, Nov. 1991, at 1, 2. 




39. Id. at 310. 
40. Id. at x. 
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& International Law. International law's potential contributions to 
negotiating peace can be categorized as follows: 1) supplying norms 
that can bound the peace process (including interim agreements) and 
the resulting permanent status agreement; 2) offering mechanisms for 
resolving disputes between the parties; 3) increasing the likelihood of 
day to day compliance with interim or permanent agreements by 
lending legitimacy to the process and the texts; and 4) providing 
building blocks for constructing the peace process and the final 
agreement. 
A. Bounding Norms 
Oslo & International Law is largely about the interaction between 
the Oslo process and Accords and the international legal norms that 
might be relevant to bounding that process and a permanent status 
agreement. Watson reviews not only specific legal requirements, such 
as the potential applicability to Israeli settlement-building of particu­
lar provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War,41 but also general procedural norms 
of international law, such as the duty to interpret and perform obliga­
tions in good faith, which he calls " [a] fundamental principle of treaty 
law" that is "declarat[ive] of customary international law."42 Oslo & 
International Law is so thorough and thoughtful that it provides an es­
sential guide not just to the Oslo Accords and their implementation 
but indeed to all the key international legal norm issues that have 
arisen with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But Watson does 
not disguise his skepticism about the practical value of international 
legal norms, whatever their level of specificity, to Israeli-Palestinian 
peacemaking. For example, in discussing Palestinian claims to a right 
of self-determination, he concludes that "the content of the right of 
self-determination is indeterminate," that "variegated practice might 
lead one to conclude that there is no meaningful right of 
self-determination at all," and that self-determination is clearly "not a 
fixed norm that points to only one solution."43 
With respect to the pivotal question of Jerusalem, Professor 
Watson notes that " [t]here are few questions in international law that 
evoke a stronger emotional response than" the question of " [w]hat is 
the status of Jerusalem, and who is entitled to territorial sovereignty 
there?"44 Then he says that "[i]f the negotiators wish to make any 
41. Id. at 1 36-42. 
42. Id. at 124. 
43. Id. at 270-72. 
44. Id. at 267. 
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progress, they will not answer it."45 Because " [n]o arbitral tribunal will 
ever resolve this dispute," says Watson, "in one sense an assessment of 
the competing claims is pointless: plainly the only way out of the log­
jam is some negotiated compromise."46 The negotiators' goal, says 
Watson, "should be to supplant the existing arguments about 
Jerusalem with a new legal regime that is binding on, and generally 
acceptable to, all parties."47 " [T]he important task," he says, "is to cre­
ate new law."48 In other words, to use legal building blocks to con­
struct processes and agreements solidifying the results of the parties' 
negotiations. 
B. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
International law offers numerous, formal mechanisms for resolv­
ing disputes between the parties to an agreement. In the Accords, the 
Palestinian Authority ("PA")/PLO and Israel specifically listed 
several such formal international dispute resolution mechanisms, 
including conciliation and arbitration, as options to which they could 
turn for resolving disputes.49 But they never chose to avail themselves 
of these mechanisms. Other provisions of the Accords required the 
parties to avail themselves of specific dispute resolution mechanisms 
in certain circumstances. For example, Article XV of the DOP man­
dates that " [d]isputes arising out of the application or interpretation of 
the DOP, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim pe­
riod, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison 
Committee."50 But the parties also failed to make use of these 
required dispute resolution mechanisms. Instead, in dispute after 
dispute, both the PA/PLO and Israel "ignored the dispute-resolution 
provisions of the Oslo Accords and of general treaty law."51 
Watson suggests that Israel and the Palestinians may have been 
wary of formal dispute resolution mechanisms in part because neither 
party was prepared to call into question the continued vitality of the 
Accords by formally accusing the other of a "material breach," and 
international law is very unclear as to what principles apply in the 
circumstance of a "minor breach. "52 For whatever the reason, includ­
ing perhaps this gap in international law, the dispute resolution 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 268. 
47. Id. at 267. 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., DOP Article XV, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 321. 
50. WATSON, supra note 8, at 321 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. at 217; see also id. at 120-21, 210. 
52. Id. at 309-10. 
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mechanisms made available by international law played virtually no 
role in the Oslo process. 
C. Legitimacy and Compliance 
Legitimacy, the factor which noncoercively encourages compliance 
with laws both domestic and international, was compellingly described 
by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.53 
The Casey Court observed that " [t]he Court's power lies . . .  in its 
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in 
the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the 
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."54 Legitimacy is 
"the source of this Court's authority" because "except to a minor 
degree, [the Court] cannot independently coerce obedience to its 
decrees. "55 Having thus summarized legitimacy's meaning and signifi­
cance, the Court went on to discuss "the conditions necessary for 
its preservation."56 For the Court, its legitimacy - the factor which 
noncoercively encourages compliance with its rulings - is not a static 
reflection of the Court's place in the Constitution, but rather some­
thing which must be tended to, preserved, and, if possible, enhanced. 
The Court places great importance on nurturing its legitimacy even 
though compliance with the Court's decisions is now solidly grounded 
in over two hundred years of American history, tradition, theory, and 
practice. 
Legitimacy maximization is comparatively even more valuable for 
encouraging compliance with agreements in the "international 
jungle." Professor Thomas Franck's seminal The Power of Legitimacy 
Among Nations is undoubtedly the foremost book on legitimacy and 
international law. In it, Franck observes that many "international rules 
of conduct are habitually obeyed by states,"57 even in the absence of a 
global sovereign "with a supranational police force."58 Franck's book 
endeavors to answer the question of why "international rules" (his 
term for international laws) "are mostly obeyed" even though they 
"usually are not enforced."59 Franck posits that the answer lies in 
legitimacy, "the non-coercive factor, or bundle of factors, predisposing 
toward voluntary obedience. "6° Franck speculates that those "texts 
53. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
54. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 20 (1990). 
58. Id. at 22. 
59. Id. at 3. 
60. Id. at 16. 
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which are rarely obeyed are obeyed rarely because - or in part 
because - they, or the institutions which generated them, do not 
appear legitimate . . .  some, or most, of the time."61 
Franck's investigation of which attributes lend legitimacy to inter­
national rules is extremely helpful for ·understanding why the Oslo 
Accords were not more often "obeyed." There is, at least thus far, no 
world policeman to force the PA/PLO and Israel to abide by the terms 
to which they agreed in the Oslo Accords, and the parties have proven 
themselves unable to forcibly coerce each other into abiding by those 
terms. In the absence of such coercive enforcement, the parties' 
willingness to obey the Oslo Accords - and each of the Accords' 
discrete provisions - would, per Franck's analysis, depend on the par­
ties' initial and continuing perception of the Accords', and discrete 
provisions', legitimacy. 
Two threshold questions regarding the Oslo Accords, and any 
legitimacy that their legal status can, or could, have lent them are, of 
course, whether the Accords were legally binding when signed and 
whether they continue to be in force. Professor Watson in Oslo & 
International Law finds that the Oslo Accords "do not fit the tradi­
tional definition of a treaty, which is an agreement between nation­
states, "62 because neither the PLO nor the PA has ever met the tradi­
tional international legal test of statehood.63 Watson notes that the 
"counterintuitive conclusion" that "the Oslo Accords are probably 
not treaties under traditional treaty law, as embodied in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties . . .  says something about the nar­
row scope of the Vienna Convention and, more generally, about the 
formalism that pervades international law."64 
Watson concludes, however, that the Accords are nonetheless "le­
gally binding as agreements between subjects of international law."65 In 
reaching this conclusion, Watson relies in part on Article 3 of the 
Vienna Convention, which provides: "The fact that the present 
Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded be­
tween States and other subjects of international law . . . shall not 
affect . . .  [t]he legal force of such agreements . . . . "66 In other words, 
says Watson, "the modern customary law of international agreements 
is broader than the Vienna Convention,"67 and "agreements involving 
61. Id. 
62. WATSON, supra note 8, at vii (emphasis added). 
63. See id. at 60, 63, 71 . 
64. Id. at 74. 
65. Id. at vii (emphasis added). 
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. I II, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 333-34. 
67. WATSON, supra note 8, at 74. 
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'other subjects of international law' may be binding under the custom­
ary law of treaties, even if they are not binding under the Vienna 
Convention itself."68 He then points to the phrasing of the Accords,69 
subsequent practice of the parties,70 and various precedents for bind­
ing agreements between states and sub-state entities71 to solidify his 
conclusion that the Oslo Accords are examples of such binding 
agreements between states and other "subject[ s] of international 
law."72 
Watson's detailed defense of his conclusion that the Accords are 
binding is necessary because the question of the Accords' binding ef­
fect, like so much in the Accords themselves, is somewhat ambiguous. 
Watson devotes several pages to rival theories that have been 
propounded on this issue, including that the Accords are "quasi­
binding 'soft law' "73 and that "the Oslo Accords are utterly non­
binding instruments that have no legal consequence whatsoever."74 
According to Watson, " [e]ven the United States, one of the principal 
facilitators of the peace process, has stepped lightly around the ques­
tion of the legal status of the Oslo Accords."75 
For Watson, the importance of the Oslo Accords being considered 
legally binding lies at least in part in the added legitimacy that seems 
to be ascribed to legally binding documents. Parties, he says, "tend to 
regard legal obligations more seriously than non-legal ones."76 If Israel 
and the Palestinians have in the Oslo Accords "signed binding com­
mitments, then the international community as well as the parties 
themselves may expect a higher degree of fidelity to the agreements 
than if they are non-binding policy papers."77 
68. Id. at 58. 
69. See id. at 56, 101. 
70. See id. at 76. 
71. See, e.g. , id. at 92-99. 
72. See, e.g. , id. at 91-92. 
73. See id. at 82. 
74. Id. at 83. 
75. Id. at 80. It is worth noting, however, that the normally encyclopedic Watson pro­
vides relatively little support for this assessment of the U.S. position, citing only a single 
draft letter from then Secretary of State Christopher to the Prime Minister of Israel at the 
time, Benjamin Netanyahu. Id. 
76. Id. at vii. As Professor Louis Henkin notes, "Nations observe law, in part, for what 
may be called 'psychological' reasons. There is an influence for law observance in the very 
quality of law, in the sense of obligation which it implies." LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS 
BEHAVE 56 (1968). "That a nation consented to an obligation," says Henkin, "inevitably 
generates some influence for its observance." Id. "Psychological" reasons for compliance 
may, as Lederach posits, be particularly important in intranational conflicts, in which the 
enemy is closer at hand and the animosities are often more intensely felt and of longer 
standing. LEDERACH, supra note 2, at 17. 
77. WATSON, supra note 8, at 55. 
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The perceived legitimacy of a process and agreement is, of course, 
affected not only by whether the agreement itself is legally binding, 
but also by various elements of the process and text.78 The Oslo 
Accords failed to bring peace partly because key elements of their de­
sign caused the Accords to lose rather than gain legitimacy as time 
passed. 
In The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Franck examines "the 
structure of rule texts themselves for evidence of literary properties 
which appear to exert a pull in the direction of voluntary compli­
ance. "79 He concludes that " [t]he pre-eminent literary property af­
fecting legitimacy is the rule text's determinacy: that which makes its 
message clear."80 He notes that " [t]he same quality may also be 
termed its 'transparency.' "81 Franck gives several reasons why 
determinacy is so critical to legitimacy. He begins with the basic fact 
that "states or persons to whose conduct the rule is directed will know 
more precisely what is expected of them, which is a necessary first step 
towards compliance. "82 He also notes that "indeterminacy . . .  makes it 
easier to justify non-compliance"83 by rendering the provision in ques­
tion so "malleable" that it is open to being twisted to mean something 
far from what it was originally intended to mean.84 
Franck's seminal work on legitimacy is one of several key works 
containing useful insights into how to foster compliance85 with interna­
tional legal instruments. Franck's book was preceded by Louis 
78. That is why some provisions of binding agreements are complied with more regular­
ity than others. In legal scholarship, this is reflected in the several books which have been 
written on compliance with nonbinding accords. See, e.g., COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: 
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah 
Shelton ed., 2000); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith 
Brown Weiss ed., 1997). 
79. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 52. 
80. Id.; see also ABRAM CHA YES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHA YES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10 
(1995) (stating "ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language" is one of the key reasons 
lying "at the root of' treaty-violating behavior). 
81 .  FRANCK, supra note 59, at 52. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 54. 
84. Id. at 54; see id. at 54-57. 
85. "Compliance" analysis looks to whether and why states actually abide by their pro­
cedural and substantive international obligations. Peter M. Haas writes that "[c]ompliance 
refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of the accord and to the imple­
menting measures that they have instituted." Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some 
Hypotheses in Search of An Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING 
ACCORDS 2 1 ,  supra note 78 [hereinafter Haas, Why Comply] . "[C)ompliance scholars," ex­
plains Professor Alvarez, "are hoping to identify which characteristics of the actors involved 
in an activity, the international environment, or the instrument involved (such as a treaty) 
have an impact on the likelihood that any international norm will be given effect." Jose E. 
Alvarez, Foreword: Why Nations Behave, 1 9  MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 305 ( 1998). 
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Henkin's important How Nations Behave and has been followed by 
other important works on the subject.86 Interestingly, all or almost all 
of these works explicitly focus on compliance with multilateral, rather 
than bilateral, regimes. This is a major gap in the literature. 
A review of the existing literature reveals that many of the factors 
that scholars have identified as creating a pull towards compliance 
with multilateral regimes were entirely absent from the Oslo Accords, 
or nearly so. Several of these compliance-pull factors seem generally 
less likely to be as present in bilateral regimes as in multilateral,87 a 
proposition surely worth future investigation. There is, however, little 
doubt about the absence of many of them from the Oslo Accords. 
Some of these compliance-pull factors were inevitably less present in 
the Oslo Accords than they might be in other bilateral, or certainly 
multilateral, agreements, because of the parties' histories, their respec­
tive places in the international community, and the particular nature 
of their conflict. Other compliance-pull factors were less present in the 
Oslo Accords because of the specific design of the Accords, and 
particularly their misplaced reliance on open-ended gradualism and 
ambiguity. 
One compliance-pull factor that Franck discusses is the phenome­
non of parties choosing to obey a rule, despite the fact that violating it 
would bring certain short-term gains, because they expect that their 
"long-term benefits from the future operation of the same norm" will 
outweigh the short-term gains.88 Thus, for example, a country might 
respect an errant diplomat's immunity today in part because it wants 
its own diplomats to be protected by that very same norm tomorrow. 
This potentially beneficial phenomenon is less applicable to the Oslo 
Accords because under Oslo - unlike with most international agree­
ments - the obligations which the two parties undertook are in most 
cases very different. The key Israeli commitments involve redeploy­
ment while the key Palestinian commitments involve cracking down 
86. The field is nonetheless apparently still in its infancy. As Peter M. Haas put it, 
"Questions of compliance - to what extent states comply, which states are likely to comply, 
what patterns of compliance exist within and across areas of regulation - have not been ex­
tensively investigated and remain poorly understood." Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: 
Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM 64, supra note 78 [hereinafter Haas, Choosing to Comply]. 
87. As the following discussion implies, there are a number of reasons why this is the 
case, including that agreements adhered to by multiple parties may more readily be per­
ceived as legitimate, that such agreements can bring to bear compliance pressure from a 
larger number of parties with "full standing" to apply such pressure, and that multilateral 
agreements often have managing entities, which, like domestic judges, can provide legitimate 
interpretations of nom1s and create "an interactive, dialectic process of justificatory 
discourse, in which norms are invoked, interpreted, and elaborated in a way that generates 
pressure for compliance." Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2638 (1997). 
88. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 57. 
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on terrorism. Thus, for example, because the Palestinians know there 
is no terrorism crackdown provision that they will need to hold the Is­
raelis to, they have no incentive to broadly interpret and vigorously 
adhere to the crackdown provisions today so that they can insist 
tomorrow that the Israelis operate on the ·basis of the same broad, 
vigorous interpretation of that same norm.89 
Franck also posits that "[a] rule with low textual determinacy," i.e. 
a rule that is ambiguous, may gain legitimacy "if it is open to a process 
of clarification by an authority recognized as legitimate by those to 
whom the rule is addressed."9° For example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
is accepted as the definitive interpreter of the people's rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. In contrast, as has been discussed above, the parties 
to the Accords failed to institute a definitive mechanism or mecha­
nisms for resolving disputes as to what the Accords' texts required of 
them. The lack of such an authoritative mechanism meant that the 
Accords could not benefit from clarification by a legitimate authority 
as a means for enhancing the texts' determinacy and legitimacy. 
The Oslo Accords also did not specify the costs or consequences of 
violations. In How Nations Behave, Louis Henkin mentions that some 
international agreements contain provisions that "make explicit the 
cost or consequences of a violation."  He notes that " [w]hile usually 
the principal purpose of such provisions is to render response more 
nearly certain and violation therefore prohibitive, definition in 
advance may also serve to limit the response and thus avoid excessive 
reaction, counter-retaliation, and the breakdown of the treaty 
system. "91 Thus the lack of Oslo Accords provisions specifying the cost 
or consequences of violations may have contributed both to the 
Accords' failure to deter violations, and to the spiral of increasingly 
violent reactions and counter-reactions that violations triggered. 
The Oslo Accords also failed to foster the creation of vested mate­
rial interests in compliance. Many international agreements create 
their "own bureaucracy with vested interests in compliance."92 The 
Oslo Accords did not. Nor did they give "powerful domestic groups" 
strong material interests "in maintaining these agreements."93 Business 
interests tend to value economically oriented provisions, and provi-
89. Louis Henkin in How NATIONS BEHAVE 51 (1968) gives a reciprocal reason for why 
"laws or obligations that operate symmetrically between nations . . .  are rarely violated." 
"(T]hat a nation has itself invoked a rule," says Henkin, "builds commitment to that rule 
when it is, in turn, invoked by others." Id. at 56. 
90. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 61. 
91 . HENKIN, supra note 89, at 52. 
92. Id. at 57. 
93. Id. at 58. Peter M. Haas, in Why Comply, refers to the phenomenon as "the mobili­
zation of domestic interests that anticipate material gain from compliance." Haas, Why 
Comply, supra note 85, at 27-28. 
1680 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 1 01:1 661 
sions that create stability and predictability. But there was not a sig­
nificant economic component to the Accords. Moreover, their 
open-endedness and gradualism, which will be discussed in Part IV of 
this Review, did not contribute to but rather undercut any ability to 
predict what the situation would look like either after each stage of 
the interim period or after a permanent-status agreement. 
In his influential essay entitled Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, Harold Koh divides the contemporary literature regarding 
compliance with international law into four conceptual strands. One 
he calls a "rationalistic instrumentalist strand that views international 
rules as instruments whereby states seek to attain their interests in 
wealth, power, and the like."94 Koh notes that 
international relations scholars such as Robert Keohane, Duncan Snidal, 
and Oran Young, and legal scholars such as Kenneth Abbott and John 
Setear, have applied increasingly sophisticated techniques of rational 
choice theory to argue that nation-states obey international law when it 
serves their short or long term self-interest to do so.95 
"Under this rationalistic account, pitched at the level of the interna­
tional system," says Koh, "nations employ cooperative strategies to 
pursue a complex, multifaceted long-run national interest, in which 
compliance with negotiated legal norms serves as a winning long-term 
strategy."96 Under the logic of this approach, the compliance-pull of 
the Oslo process was relatively weak for at least two reasons. First, the 
lack of clarity as to the nature of the permanent status towards which 
the process was leading weakened the Accords' compliance-pull as a 
specific "instrument" for attaining "wealth" and "power." Second, the 
relative isolation of the Israelis and the Palestinians from the interna­
tional community, each for different reasons,97 left them less con­
cerned about further exclusion for failure to "employ cooperative 
strategies." It also may have made the two parties skeptical that their 
contributing to the strength of the international system by complying 
with its norms would result in their either 1) being substantively re­
warded by the international community or 2) otherwise benefiting 
from the system's increased vitality. Having relatively less faith and 
investment in the international system, the parties were less subject to 
94. Koh, supra note 87, at 2632. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. For example, Israel remains the only United Nations member not fully part of a re­
gional grouping and has thus never served on the Security Council and has almost never 
been selected to serve on other commissions and the like. Israel also views the United 
Nations system with great suspicion because of the numerous one-sided votes critical of 
Israel that have been cast in various U.N. fora. As for the Palestinians, they, lacking a state, 
have not been admitted to membership in the United Nations and their people and leader­
ship have often been treated as pariahs by much of the international community. 
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a pull toward compliance based on a long-run interest in the interna­
tional system's success. 
Koh identifies "a second explanatory pathway" in modem compli­
ance theory as following "a Kantian, liberal vein."98 "The Kantian 
thread," says Koh, "divides into two identifiable strands."99 One is 
based on Franck's previously discussed "notion of rule-legitimacy, and 
another . . . makes more expansive claims for the causal role of 
national identity."100 In the second camp, says Koh, are " '[l]iberal 
international relations' theorists, such as Andrew Moravcsik and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, [who] have argued that the determinative 
factor for whether nations obey can be found, not at a systemic level, 
but at the level of domestic structure. "10 1  Koh explains that: 
Under this view, compliance depends significantly on whether or not the 
state can be characterized as "liberal" in identity, that is, having a form 
of representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and 
a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law. Flipping the now-familiar 
Kantian maxim that "democracies don't fight one another," these theo­
rists posit that liberal democracies are more likely to 'do law' with one 
another . . . .  1 02 
As a set of agreements between a relatively liberal democracy and an 
authoritarian regime, the Oslo Accords did not benefit from this prin­
ciple. 
The final strand of contemporary compliance theory which Koh 
identifies is "a 'constructivist' strand."103 Koh explains that " [u]nlike 
interest theorists, who tend to treat state interests as given, 'construc­
tivists' have long argued that states and their interests are socially con­
structed by 'commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms of 
behavior, or shared terms of discourse.' "104 Under this view, says Koh, 
nations "obey international rules not just because of sophisticated cal­
culations about how compliance or noncompliance will affect their in­
terests, but because a repeated habit of obedience remakes their inter­
ests so that they come to value rule compliance.''105 This type of pull 
towards compliance also had relatively little impact on the Oslo proc­
ess because 1) the parties, as relative outsiders to the international le­
gal community (this was especially true of the Palestinians) had not 
developed a habit of obedience to international law, and 2) the gradu-
98. Koh, supra note 87, at 2633. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 




105. Id. at 2634. 
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alism of the Oslo process meant that many of its norms were regularly 
changing and thus also not subject to the development of habitual 
obedience. 
Thus we see that the Oslo Accords' perceived legitimacy and pull 
towards compliance were weak from the very beginning. The protago­
nists' history, nature, and place in the international community had 
left the Accords with relatively little compliance-pull potential to draw 
from. Mistakes in working with what compliance-pull potential was 
left were particularly liable to be fatal. 
D. Building Blocks 
The next category of contribution which international law can 
make to peacemaking is "building blocks." Building blocks are the 
"nuts and bolts" out of which peace agreements, as well as interim 
processes such as Oslo's, are built. Some of the building blocks which 
international law offers to negotiators seeking to craft peace processes 
and final agreements are those which Blix and Emerson provide 
examples of in their Treaty Maker's Handbook,'06 i.e. , the types of 
agreements and provisions that international legal practice has devel­
oped for recording in a binding, written fashion the various aspects of 
a "meeting of the minds" between two contending parties. Types of 
agreement include, for example, declarations of principles, implemen­
tation memoranda, protocols, and "notes for the record."  Types of 
provisions include chapeaux, jurisdictional provisions, definitional 
provisions, and entry into force provisions. Another type of building 
block might be roughly defined as "mechanisms": these include 1 )  the 
many different types of practical commitments and processes, set out 
in an agreement, that can be used to advance towards the parties' 
goals, including elections, transitional periods, anti-incitement provi­
sions, redeployments, and delegations of power; and 2) the many dif­
ferent types of conceptual tools or methodologies upon which the 
parties can rely to reflect in the legal text their level of agreement, 
including specificity, ambiguity, paralleled reciprocity, and open­
ended gradualistic processes. 
As we discussed, many compliance-pull factors are predetermined 
by the parties' history, nature, and place in the international commu­
nity. The creative use of building blocks, on the other hand, is where a 
treaty's negotiators have the opportunity to make the most of the 
compliance-pull potential that is left. The building blocks, and espe­
cially the mechanisms, are also the key points where the international 
legal rubber meets the road. On a day-to-day basis, it is, for example, 
the specifics of an agreement's anti-incitement provisions that will 
106. THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds., 1973). 
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govern one party's television programming and the other side's 
response to it. In other words, in the absence of a coercive Israeli 
censor sitting in the Palestinian television studio, it is the compliance­
pull of the anti-incitement provisions, including their clarity and their 
coherence, that will play the key role in determining whether they are 
obeyed. 
As mentioned above, little scholarly attention has thus far been 
paid to how peace process and agreement provisions can be designed 
so as to maximize the likelihood that parties will comply with them. 
This Part has provided an overview of the legal tools which peace pro­
cess framers and agreement drafters can draw upon to maximize the 
likelihood of compliance. Parts IV and V of this Review will assess in 
more detail the pivotal effect on the parties' compliance of the exten­
sive use in the Accords of two key mechanisms - ambiguity and 
open-ended gradualism. It is this author's hope that these Parts will 
make some small contribution to advancing the study of how peace 
process and agreement provisions can be designed so as to maximize 
the likelihood that parties will comply with them. 
III. THE POSSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF BAD FAITH 
Before addressing in detail pivotal, methodological aspects of the 
Oslo Accords, this Review must address the point of view that any 
inquiry into Oslo's failure to achieve its declared objective should 
begin and end with Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to make peace with 
Israel on any terms. At a March 13, 2003, Congressional hearing, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, in discussing the lack of progress 
toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, said that "(t]he princi­
pal problem has been the continuing violence and terrorism that has 
come from the Palestinian side directed against the State of Israel." 107 
Powell continued, "We had made it clear to the Palestinian side that 
they needed to bring up new leadership because the old leadership 
was not getting the violence under control and was not coming for­
ward with initiatives or ideas that would help us build a dialogue with 
Israel." 108 
Powell was referring, of course, to the June 24, 2002, Rose Garden 
speech in which President Bush said that "peace requires a new and 
different Palestinian leadership," and called "on the Palestinian 
people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror" be-
107. Powell Faults Palestinians in Mideast, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2003, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2003). 
108. Id. 
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cause " [t]oday, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing, 
terrorism. "109 
In discussing President Bush's June 24, 2002, speech, National 
Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice said that the Palestinian leadership 
"has shown no ability or willingness, particularly willingness, to use its 
authority to fight terror . . . .  "1 w "Palestinian leaders," Rice noted, 
"rejected a possibility of peace and a state from an Israeli Prime 
Minister who was willing to go further than anybody ever thought." 1 1 1  
"This administration," said Rice, "has tried with the current 
Palestinian leadership to make progress, but all that we've gotten in 
return is continued activities that support and encourage terror. " 1 12 
"How," asked Rice, "can you work with a leadership that on one hand 
says it wants the peace process and on the other hand continues to 
work with terrorists who are undermining the peace process?"1 1 3  
Joel Singer, Israel's attorney who joined the process while it was 
still in its early stages in Oslo, has stated that "Oslo did not die from a 
thousand pinpricks . . .  the problem was and is that the Palestinians 
don't have a leadership which is capable of making peace with 
Israel."1 14 "The only issue," he says, "lies outside the words of the 
agreement, and that is that the Palestinians are not ready for peace."115 
A thorough analysis of the causes of Oslo's failure needs to take 
into account the possibility that a successful deal was impossible 
because Yasser Arafat was from the beginning acting in bad faith.1 16 
Not surprisingly, bad-faith negotiation in implementation of an 
109. Press Release, White House, President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership 
(June 24, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov. 
1 10. Insight (CNN International Television Broadcast, July 1, 2002) (transcript available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library). 
111. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleeza Rice (June 27, 2002) 
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library). 
112. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, June 30, 2002) (transcript available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library). 
113. Kenneth R. Bazinet, U.S.: Arafat in Rearview Mirror, DAILY NEWS (New York), 
July 1, 2002, at 9. 
114.  Telephone Interview with Joel Singer, Israel's Attorney (Feb. 1 1 ,  2003). 
115. Id. 
116. See, for example, Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 
1 ,  2002, at 18-19 ("ls there any sign that Arafat has changed and is ready to make historic 
decisions for peace? I see no indication of it."). See also the noted left-wing Israeli historian 
Benny Morris who, in writing that recent "Palestinian behavior" has "provided the unhappy 
ground for a serious re-examination of my own political assumptions," posits "the possibility 
that Oslo, from Arafat's perspective, may have been a giant act of duplicity." Arafat, notes 
Morris, "told a Muslim audience in a Johannesburg mosque in 1994 that he was willing to 
play along in order to win concessions but without ever intending to sign a final peace treaty 
that recognized Israel's permanent legitimacy and permanent boundaries." Benny Morris, 
Bleak Conclusions from the History of a People, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21 ,  2003-Apr. 28, 
2003, at 31. 
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agreement to negotiate towards agreement is a violation of customary 
international law. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties codifies the requirement, stating that every international 
agreement in force "is binding upon the parties to it and must be per­
formed by them in good faith."1 17 The Vienna Convention does not it­
self contain a definition of either good or bad faith, but Article 2.5 of 
the Unidroit Principles contains the following definition of "bad faith" 
which seems particularly appropriate for an "agreement to agree" of 
the Oslo type: "it is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or 
continue negotiations intending not to reach an agreement with the 
other party. " 1 1 8 
One might note that if Yasser Arafat entered into the Oslo process 
in bad faith, it would, notwithstanding Kim Jong 11 and Saddam 
Hussein, be a relatively rare phenomenon on the international scene. 
According to Richard Bilder, "in almost all cases nations carry out 
their agreements in good faith."1 19 As Bilder puts it, "a fear that 
nations enter into international agreements with the idea of cheating 
or tricking the other party assumes a Machiavellian rationality and 
flexibility of which most governments are not capable in the real 
world."120 It is obviously hard to imagine a democracy, with its checks 
and balances and relatively open decisionmaking, entering into an 
agreement in bad faith. It is less difficult to imagine a dictatorship, 
where all decisionmaking is ultimately in the head of one man, so 
doing. 
It may ultimately be impossible to know whether or not Yasser 
Arafat intended to keep his word when he wrote to Yitzhak Rabin on 
September 9, 1993, that " [t]he PLO commits itself . . .  to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all 
outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved 
through negotiations" and that "the PLO renounces the use of terror­
ism and other acts of violence."1 21 As Dennis Ross - the lead U.S. ne­
gotiator for most of the Oslo process, including Camp David - put it: 
1 17. See WATSON, supra note 8, at 124. 
118. Quoted in Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and 
Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97, 152 (1997). 
119. RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 8 
(1981). Or as Louis Henkin asserted in How Nations Behave in 1968, "It  is probably the case 
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time." HENKIN, supra note 76, at 42. Writing some thirty 
years later, Harold Koh opined of Henkin's assertion that "empirical work since then seems 
largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description." Koh, supra note 87, at 
2599. But see Haas, Choosing to Comply, supra note 86, at 44, who says that "[t]he lawyers' 
dictum that 'most treaties are complied with most of the time' is surely premature, and 
probably exaggerated." 
120. BILDER, supra note 1 1 9, at 9-10. 
121. Letter from Arafat to Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 
315 .  
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You couldn't conclude [the conflict], as it turned out, because you had 
someone like Yasser Arafat, for whom ending the conflict in many ways 
required ending himself. He was defined by conflict. He was defined by 
struggle. He was defined by the cause. To end it was something that was 
more than he could do, because it meant giving up his mythologies . . .  
Yasser Arafat . . .  simply was not up to the task. 122 
But the possibility of such bad faith, whenever it may have entered 
into play, does not mean that the only lesson to be learned from Oslo's 
failure is the danger of signing agreements with the likes of Yasser 
Arafat. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are going to go away, 
and Yasser Arafat is certainly not going to be around forever. Indeed, 
if the vast majority of the commentators, from across the spectrum, in 
Lessons of Failure are right, analysis of the flaws of the Oslo process is 
essential for at least two reasons. First, the open-ended gradualism 
and ambiguity of the Oslo Accords dearly had a corrosive effect in 
and of themselves, as this Review will discuss. There are lessons to be 
learned from this that are generally applicable to designing peace ne­
gotiations and peace agreement texts to maximize compliance with 
their terms. Second, any peace deal the Israelis and Palestinians ulti­
mately reach will likely use the Oslo Accords as a point of departure. 
This will be in keeping with the past history of Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations, over the course of which, as Stein and Lewis report: 
"Yesterday's rejected or ignored proposal, document, or procedure 
may become tomorrow's accepted agreement, newly adopted position, 
or process. "1 23 If this is the case, it is critical to understand which 
aspects of the Oslo Accords should, on the basis of experience thus 
far, be disqualified from reappearing irrespective of the leader on the 
Palestinian side of the deal. 
IV. OPEN-ENDED GRADUALISM 
The first problematic methodology on which the Oslo Accords 
heavily relied was open-ended gradualism. "Open-endedness" is this 
Reviewer's term for the Oslo Accords having left virtually completely 
"open for a later agreement"124 the fundamental question of what a 
permanent-status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians 
would look like. Terje Roed-Larsen defined the separate but related 
concept of "gradualism" as "moving gradually forward and building 
trust along the way."125 This Part focuses first on open-endedness and 
then on gradualism. 
1 22. Q & A with Jim Clancy (CNN International television broadcast, Dec. 26, 2002) 
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library). 
123. STEIN & LEWIS, supra note 10, at 25-26. 
124. Singer, supra note 26. 
125. Roed-Larsen, supra note 32, at 6. 
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In the opening essay to Lessons of Failure, Robert Rothstein 
starkly notes of the Oslo Accords that "much was left unresolved by 
Oslo - nearly everything of substance."126 Indeed - and this cannot 
be emphasized enough - almost none of the over one thousand pages 
of agreements, annexes, maps, and other documentation127 that consti­
tute the Oslo Accords say anything at all about the terms of a final 
agreement. 
The full name of the DOP is the "Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements." Although the full title is 
rarely used, it is entirely appropriate to the Declaration, the provisions 
of which relate almost entirely to interim-status issues. Indeed, of the 
seventeen articles in the Declaration of Principles, only the Preamble, 
Article I (titled "Aim of the Negotiations"), and Article V (titled 
"Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations") provide 
any clues about the permanent-status negotiations, let alone the terms 
of a final settlement. 
The preamble states in relevant part: 
The [parties] agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confronta­
tion and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, 
and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security 
· and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and 
historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. 128 
Article I states: 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle 
East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian 
Interim Self-Government Authority . . . for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the 
whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status 
will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338.129 
Article V states in relevant part: 
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but 
not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, 
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people represen­
tatives. 
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, 
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, bor-
126. Robert L. Rothstein, A Fragile Peace: Could a "Race to the Bottom" Have Been 
A voided?, in LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 1, 4 [hereinafter'Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom "]. 
127. See KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 57. 
128. DOP Preamble, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317. 
129. DOP Article I, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317. 
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ders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of 
common interest. 
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status nego­
tiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached 
for the interim period. 130 
That is it. The DOP contains no further guidance on final-status 
issues. As Joel Singer, the lawyer on the Israeli government team 
which negotiated the DOP, has put it, the DOP is "conspicuously 
silent about the form the permanent status arrangements will take," 
and "the principle that all options should be left open is explicitly 
stated in Article V(4) ."131 
The other Oslo Accords add virtually nothing to this extreme 
vagueness about permanent status. Nowhere do any of the Oslo 
Accords mention the possibility of Palestinian statehood. Thus, with 
respect to permanent status, the Oslo Accords could be characterized 
as an agreement to agree with all options (except a resort to violence) 
left open. 132 
International agreements, including international peace agree­
ments, are of course basically a form of contract. Because legal sys­
tems have much more experience with commercial contracts than with 
peace contracts, it is worth taking a moment to examine what contract 
law has to say about the sort of open-endedness at the heart of the 
Oslo Accords. 
An 1857 quote from a member of the House of Lords, reported by 
Farnsworth, pithily summarized the attitude of traditional contract 
theory towards open-ended agreements: "An agreement to enter into 
an agreement upon terms to be afterwards settled by the parties is a 
contradiction in terms. It is absurd . . . .  "133 The traditional view is that 
"no contract can be formed until clear and complete agreement is 
reached on material terms."134 In straying from that principle, the 
DOP is consistent with a recent trend in commercial contract law 
towards believing that "preliminary agreements serve a valuable func­
tion in the marketplace."135 As Farnsworth recognizes, the concept of 
an agreement "that is made during negotiations in anticipation of 
some later agreement that will be the culmination of negotiations" is 
130. DOP Article V, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 318. 
131 .  Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements: Some Legal Aspects, JUST., Winter 1994, at 4, 13. 
132. Id. at 5. 
133. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 2 17, 264 (1987). 
134. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 623 n.2. (quoting EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 411-12 (4th ed. 1991)). 
135. Id. at 5. 
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now reflected in a number of commercial legal tools, including letters 
of intent, commitment letters, binders, agreements in principle, and 
memoranda of understandings. 1 36 
One pair of commentators has written: 
Recent changes in modern international transactions have led to an 
increased reliance on precontractual instruments. Commercial transac­
tions are increasingly consummated between parties of diverse cultural 
and legal traditions. Parties are often unfamiliar with the ethical rules 
and legal ramifications of the negotiating process in other countries, 
which may lead the parties to write out their goals at a relatively early 
stage of the negotiation. 137 
Because cultural and legal differences increase the risk of misun­
derstanding and "impede[) the development of personal trust," these 
differences "increas[ e] the perceived need for written protection" at a 
relatively early stage of the process.138 The use of agreements to agree 
seems to be particularly common in international joint-venture nego­
tiations. In such negotiations - as with Oslo - there is "a meeting, 
and sometimes, a clash, of two cultures," and the process of negotiat­
ing the interim and final agreements is an "integral" part of the 
bridge-building.139 
But a critical factor distinguishes the Oslo Accords from the pre­
liminary agreements with open terms in the commercial world. Courts 
are available to resolve commercial disputes or, in certain circum­
stances, even to impose reasonable contract terms. For example, as the 
Uniform Commercial Code notes, courts can determine and supply 
the price term - "a reasonable price at the time for delivery" -
should negotiations on price fail with respect to a binding agreement 
for the sale of goods that leaves the price open for later determination 
by the parties.140 And international joint-venture attorneys know that 
" [a )!though parties to joint venture negotiations are not eager to 
confront the possibility of deadlock, it is always a good idea to include 
provisions governing what happens when the parties cannot agree. "141 
Because commercial assets are relatively easy to value and there is 
136. Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 249-50. 
137. John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontracttta/ Liability and the Ditty of Good Faith 
Negotiation in International Transactions, 17 Haus. J. INT'L L. 1 ,  8 (1994). 
138. Id. 
139. Michael E. Hooton, Structuring and Negotiating International Joint Ventures, 27 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1994). Hooton notes that one example of the challenges of 
negotiating international joint ventures is "the highly publicized McDonald's joint venture 
[in Russia which] took over twelve years to negotiate." Id. at n.6. Compared to this example, 
five years may not have been a long time to develop a permanent peace settlement between 
the Israelis and Palestinians. 
140. Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 253 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978)); see also id. at 
286. 
141. Hooton, supra note 139, at 1028. 
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considerable precedent for courts supplying terms or arbitrators allo­
cating the assets of a failed joint venture, commercial parties enter 
into preliminary agreements with a good sense of what the other party 
might reasonably have in mind and considerable certainty as to the 
bounds of what might happen if the parties reach deadlock. 
The Oslo Accords present a sharp contrast. They constitute an 
agreement to agree with all options (except violence) left open, and no 
clear sense of what each others' bottom lines might be - in fact 
the parties avoided discussing their bottom lines at Oslo. Yet, the 
agreements provided no strong mechanism to govern what would 
happen if the parties turned out to be unable to reach an agreement. If 
the majority of contributors to Lessons of Failure agree on any one 
thing, it is that the gradual, open-ended aspects of the Oslo process, so 
carefully designed to foster trust, in fact did the opposite - they 
corrosively eroded trust. As Rob Malley, a member of the Clinton 
Administration negotiating team for the Oslo Accords, and Hussein 
Agha of Oxford University have written, " [t]he incrementalism of the 
previous decade . . .  did not fail as a result of the parties' ill will or a 
lack of faithful implementation; rather, it was the approach that con­
tributed to both. "142 
There are several reasons why the open-endedness of the Oslo 
process may have done more to foster ill will and discourage imple­
mentation than to create trust, encourage compliance, and promote 
forward movement towards peace: 
• Other Side's Motives Left Unclear: Because neither party made a 
commitment regarding final status, each party continued to doubt 
the other's good faith. The Accords' failure to delineate the 
conflict-ending concessions that each party would make meant 
that, at any given stage, one side could suspect that the other 
side's 
shift toward peace is merely tactical, a platform to raise new de­
mands or to achieve ancient goals by slower and at least momentar­
ily less violent means. The fear of being duped is especially 
strong . . .  because . . .  the consequences of being wrong about the 
intentions of the other could be catastrophic for both leaders and 
followers. 143 
Many Israelis, for example, feared that the PLO was simply im­
plementing its infamous "doctrine of stages," by which the PLO 
would establish itself on whatever piece of Palestine it could get, 
with the intention of using that as a staging ground "to achieve . . .  
the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory," 
142. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, The Last Negotiation: How to End the Middle East 
Peace Process, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS 61 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2002). 
143. Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom,"  supra note 126, at 7 .  
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including all of Israel.144 Many Israelis feared that for the 
Palestinians - and particularly for Yasser Arafat - the interim 
period was a cynical "peace" of the kind that Ambrose Bierce 
defined as "a period of cheating between two periods of fight­
ing."145 Meanwhile, as historian Rashid Khalidi has put it, many 
Palestinians feared that 
Oslo gave [the Israelis] the luxury of another decade, during 
which . . .  the people who were paving the West Bank and turning it 
into an extension of Israel have gotten another 100,000 Israelis set­
tled there, have paved hundreds of miles of roads, and are even less 
likely to give up these territories than they might have been a dec­
ade or more ago.146 
Thus many Palestinians feared that the implementing agreement 
would "de facto [come to represent] the permanent status agree­
ment."141 
• Each Side's Gains Continued to Be Small Enough to Risk Losing: 
The Accords' failure to specify, let alone immediately provide, 
the major, conflict-ending gains that each party was to eventually 
receive meant that neither side had a stake in the agreements' 
success that was so large that they were unwilling to risk losing 
it. 148 Thus, as Palestinian professor Khalil Shikaki stated: "Oslo's 
open-endedness . . . meant that neither side would make a full 
commitment to the peace process."149 Neither side had rnade, or 
clearly stood to make, a gain suffieiently large as to induce such a 
commitment. 
• It's Harder to Aspire to a Hazy Final Status: Because the Accords 
specified so little about the ultimate arrangements, leaders on 
both sides had no vision to sell to their people. Breakthrough 
notes that "developing an attractive vision of a desirable future" 
can pull people "forward toward agreement" (p. xx). John Paul 
Lederach points out that, in intrastate conflicts, "the futures of 
144. Yossi Ben-Aharon, Foundering ll111Sions: The Demise of the Oslo Process, in 
LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 59-60. 
145. Justus R. Weiner, Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace?, 24 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 62 (2000) (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S . 
DICTIONARY (T.Y. Cromwell 1979) (1911)). 
146. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 8, 2002) (transcript 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library). 
147. Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in Light of the Expectations 
of Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 667, 699 (1996) (reviewing 
SHIMON PERES, BATTLING FOR PEACE: A MEMOIR (1995) and MAHMOUD ABBAS, 
THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS (1995)). 
148. Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom,"  supra note 126, at 5. 
149. Khalil Shikaki, Ending the Conflict: Can the Parties Afford It?, in LESSONS OF 
FAILURE, pp. 37, 40. 
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those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and 
interdependent." Accordingly, it is particularly important that the 
"[o]pportunity . . .  be given for people to look forward and envi­
sion their shared future."150 Yet, because it was so open-ended, 
Oslo gave leaders on both sides very little material they could use 
to sketch a promising future to which their peoples could aspire. 
Rothstein notes that "it is hard to build a constituency for peace 
when the shape of the peace remains unclear and unsettled. "151 
As Manuel Hassassian, the Executive Vice President of 
Bethlehem University, put it, Oslo's open-endedness put on 
people "pressure to give up long-held values while not knowing 
what they will get in return." 152 
• Progress Left Hostage to Extremists: The Oslo process began 
with unofficial contacts which, when they proved promising, were 
turned into official negotiations. Ron Pundak was one of the two 
Israeli academics who started the unofficial process. Pundak 
eventually concluded of the Accords that " [o]utstanding issues . .  . 
leave the agreement hostage to extremists on both sides, who . .  . 
continue to fight in order to thwart the possibility of concluding 
these issues in future negotiations, and thereby leave the process 
of peace and reconciliation at their mercy." 153 The mounting 
damage caused by these extremists, and particularly the Palestin­
ian terrorists, was one key factor that gradually sapped the 
Accords' legitimacy. 
• Both Sides Continually Seek to Improve Their Positions for Final 
Negotiations: As Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki observed, 
"since 'real' negotiations have not even started, both sides sought 
to improve their negotiating positions. "154 Rob Malley and 
Hussein Agha agree, saying "both sides treated the interim 
period . . .  as a mere warm-up to the final negotiations; not as a 
chance to build trust, but as an opportunity to maximize their 
bargaining positions." 155 In a similar vein, Joel Singer noted that 
150. LEDERACH, supra note 2, at 27. 
151 .  Rothstein, Are There Only Lessons, supra note 30, at 163.  
152.  Manuel Hassassian, Why Did Oslo Fail? Lessons for the Future, in LESSONS OF 
FAILURE, pp.  1 14, 1 16. 
153. Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 
88, 105. Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff has written of this phenomenon as follows: "Both 
sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians equally and in fact also the American mediators, did 
not understand that prolonged procrastination in the implementation of sensitive agree­
ments opens the door to actions by extremists on both sides, the aim of which is to torpedo 
any compromise." Ze'ev Schiff, The lies after Oslo, HAARETZ, May 30, 2002, available at 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com. 
154. Shikaki, supra note 149, at 40. 
155. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at S L  
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the interim period established by Oslo in some ways resembled a 
cease-fire: "If you know a cease-fire is being negotiated and you 
have two more days to do whatever you can do before it is im­
posed . . .  you use those last two days to improve your position. In 
this case, instead of two days we have five years."156 
• Each party may have emphasized position improvement even 
more once relations between the parties started to plunge. For 
example, when Arafat threatened to resume the intifada against 
Israel, then Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon "reacted by telling 
Jewish 'settlers to run and capture as many hills as possible . . . .  
Everything we don't take will eventually get into the hands of the 
Palestinians. ' "157 One scholar has written that open-ended proc­
esses like Oslo are liable to be treated not as a "framework for in­
cubating trust and reconciliation, but as an array of legalistic and 
definitive limits for the opposing side versus an array of loopholes 
and opportunities for the aggressive, adversarial exploitation of 
opportunities for one's own side."158 Rothstein concludes that 
"the result was a peace process that became the continuation of 
conflict by other means."159 This was another dynamic that gradu­
ally sapped the Accords of their legitimacy. The more steps a 
party took that maximized its bargaining position for the end 
game, but violated the Accords, the less the other party felt in­
clined to comply with the Accords. 
• Open-endedness Enables Leaders to Feed Dangerous Expecta­
tions: The open-endedness of the Oslo texts "allowed each side to 
make contrary claims at home," writes David Makovsky. "Israeli 
leaders," explains Makovsky, "were able to continually promise 
their constituents what they wanted - including a united Jerusa­
lem under Israeli sovereignty - while Arafat could promise his 
people what they wanted - including the right of return for all 
Palestinians to long-abandoned homes inside Israel." Arafat, he 
says, 
sold Oslo to his public by telling them it guaranteed a return to the 
1967 lines and entailed no compromises. He led his people to be­
lieve that they would get 100 percent of the land they wanted. This 
unsurprisingly led to unrealistic expectations and the explosion of 
156. Joel Singer, A Very Bad Agreement, but the Only Agreement Possible, MIDDLE 
EAST FORUM, Mar. 19, 1997, at http://www.meforum.org/article/322. 
157. Weiner, supra note 145, at 33 (quoting Danna Harman et al., Arafat Warns: Our 
Rifles Are Ready, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17, 1998, at 1) (ellipsis and internal quotation 
marks in Weiner)). 
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frustration (egged on by the PA) that followed the failure of Camp 
David. 160 
Oslo's framers hoped that during the interim period the gradually 
increasing cooperation betwe�n the, two sides, and the concessions of 
each side to the other, would build trust that would outweigh the dan­
gers of leaving the process open-ended. But, instead, open-endedness 
only increased the distrust. Ultimately, distrust infected the process 
and prevented the slowly increasing cooperation and gradual conces­
sions that were supposed to ,overcome it. Because the two sides were 
unclear as to the goals they were trying to achieve by making conces­
sions, they had difficulty selling the concessions to their people. 
Concessionary "[s]teps that might have been easy to win support for 
domestically if packaged as part of a final agreement were condemned 
as unwarranted concessions when carried out in isolation."16 1 
The open-ended gradualism of the Accords engendered several 
problems in addition to those caused by the open-endedness of the 
gradual process's destination. Gradualism turned out to be a severe 
detriment in and of itself. For example, the almost continual negotia­
tions and renegotiations which were required by Oslo's gradual 
approach meant that the Accords were unable to benefit from the 
transaction cost savings, which Chayes and Chayes identify as a key 
factor encouraging compliance with treaty rules. 162 Chayes and Chayes 
point out that "[g]overnmental resources for policy analysis and deci­
sionmaking are costly and in short supply" and governments "seek to 
conserve these resources for the most pressing and urgent matters."163 
Since "continuous recalculation" of treaty provision costs and benefits 
expends such resources, Chayes and Chayes conclude that rote com­
pliance with established treaty provisions "saves transaction costs."164 
Since the gradualistic approach of the Oslo Accords meant that many 
of the treaty provisions governing Israeli-Palestinian relations were 
regularly being reconsidered and/or changing, the Oslo Accords were 
rarely able to benefit from the compliance-promoting efficiencies of 
routinization. Instead, governmental resources for policy analysis and 
decisionmaking on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides were 
regularly being expended to calculate the costs and benefits of incre­
mental changes. This may have resulted in too few resources being left 
available for addressing the most urgent and pressing permanent­
status issues. 
160. David Makovsky, Middle East Peace Through Partition, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN 
CRISIS, supra note 142, at 10. 
161. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51. 
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The frequent and unpredictable changes to roads, borders and 
border procedures, tax collection procedures, and other economic 
practicalities that were occasioned by Oslo's gradualistic evolution 
also made it hard for business, which hungers for stability and predict­
ability, to develop a vested, material interest in the Accords. At the 
same time, the scale of the many individual agreements was too small 
to engender encouragement by outsiders of the sort that might have 
helped positively influence implementation by the parties. As Malley 
puts it, "the succession of piecemeal, incremental agreements made it 
more difficult to mobilize the support of other countries."165 
Manuel Hassassian, the Executive Vice President of Bethlehem 
University, contends that the succession of minor, interim �greements 
also caused the two publics to become increasingly skeptical as to the 
value of agreements between the two sides: "What made the situa­
tion . . .  · incomprehensible to the public on both sides is that 
agreements were signed one after the other, yet on the ground things 
were not improving."166 Hassassiari notes: 
After agreements were signed, and the handshakes and the hugs, the 
next day was business as usual in terms of the actual conflict on the 
ground. An agreement was followed with an implementation protocol, 
then another protocol for the implementation of the implementation 
protocol. The process was simply no longer credible . . . .  167 
Rob Malley and Hussein Agha contend that gradualism also 
increased friction between the two leaderships, noting that " [b]y mul­
tiplying the number of obligations each side agreed to, the successive 
interim accords increased the potential for missteps · and missed 
deadlines."168 "Each interim commitment," says Malley, "became the 
focal point for the next dispute and a microcosm for the overall con­
flict, leading to endless renegotiations and diminished respect for the 
text of the signed agreements themselves."169 Thus, the open-ended 
gradualism of the Oslo Accords not only failed to build trust and 
confidence, it created a dynamic that in many ways over time actually 
eroded the Accords' legitimacy. 
The detriments of Oslo's open-ended, gradual approach have led 
virtually every one of the Lessons of Failure · commentators who 
believe peace is possible to the conclusion that the Oslo process would 
have been better off with much greater clarity as to final status from 
the very beginning. Irrespective of whether such was possible in 1993, 
165. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51. 
166. Hassassian, supra note 152, at 1 19. 
167. Id. 
168. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51. 
169. Id. 
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they each believe that getting the parties to agree to at least a broad 
outline of the final settlement is imperative now. 
Ron Pundak suggests that "while its implementation could be -
and perhaps should be - gradual," the outlines of a permanent-status 
agreement must be made clear to both sides.110 Hassassian agrees, 
saying that "there should have been general agreement from the be­
ginning on the key issues. It is the details that can be worked out step 
by step, but not the guiding principles. In fact, the problem with the 
guiding principles adopted in Oslo is that they were too vague." 17 1 
Israeli professor Moshe Ma'oz believes that: 
an Israeli vague commitment regarding the creation of a Palestinian state 
in the West Bank and Gaza say, within five years, with a certain status in 
East Jerusalem to be negotiated could have served as a strong incentive 
to the PLO to fully and credibly implement its commitments to Israel, 
particularly in the arena of security. 172 
"In return," says Ma'oz, "the PLO could have allayed Israeli concerns 
had it committed itself at Oslo to implement the Palestinian refugees' 
'right of return' in the future Palestinian state, not in the state of Israel 
proper." 173 
The failed "Road Map" set forth by the Bush Administration in 
the winter and spring of 2003 was in one respect much clearer than the 
Oslo Accords had been as to the ultimate goal of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Road Map included an explicit 
commitment to the goal of creating a Palestinian state, an historic con­
cession from the Israeli perspective.174 
But the Road Map left further details regarding the Palestinian 
state, including its borders and other potential attributes (e.g., demili­
tarized status), unspecified. As Max Abrahms writes in a Los Angeles 
Times op-ed, "The road map takes off where Oslo failed. It again 
postpones the difficult final-status issues." 175 Khalil Shikaki says the 
Road Map "didn 't  give the Palestinians enough incentive to move 
forward" because it left too open "what they would be getting in 
the end" with respect to borders, settlement removal, and degree of 
limitations on sovereignty.176 The Road Map also left too much open 
170. Pundak, supra note 1 53, at 106. 
171 .  Hassassian, supra note 152, at 127. 
172. Moshe Ma'oz, The Oslo Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown, in 
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from an Israeli perspective. For example, on the Palestinian "right of 
return," which the Palestinians must concede if the Israelis are to 
agree to a permanent agreement, the "Road Map" contained no 
significant concessions. Thus both Israelis and Palestinians were left to 
feel that the Road Map was still too open-ended. 
In addition, the Road Map's  complex list of phases and steps 
suffered from the same gradualism problems as did the Oslo Accords. 
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley describe the Road Map's problems 
as follows: 
The Bush administration's road map . . .  is faltering - because of its own 
deficiencies, not merely those of the negotiating parties. Like past peace 
plans, it is based on the idea that incremental stages will bring Israelis 
and Palestinians to the point where they can negotiate the issues that 
separate them.177 
"Because the ultimate solution remains up for grabs," contend 
Agha and Malley, the Road Map "protagonists pursue policies 
designed to shape its contours rather than to promote a common 
enterprise. The vagueness of the goal and an excess of suspicion mean 
that neither side has an incentive to live up to its obligations in a 
wholehearted way."178 Agha and Malley add that " [e]ach incremental 
gesture becomes the focal point of the next crisis" and " [e]very addi­
tional step creates one more opportunity for a misstep or deliberate 
sabotage."179 
Because the Road Map required that so many incremental steps be 
accomplished in such impossibly short time frames, it practically guar­
anteed that many steps would not be accomplished, thereby further 
undermining the credibility of the peace process and adding yet more 
to both sides' lists of unkept commitments.180 At the same time, the 
Road Map offered "no view as to what constitutes compliance (i.e., 
100 percent effort, 100 percent results, or 'reasonable effort producing 
passable results'?), nor does it prioritize which requirements are 
deal-breakers. " 181 "In substance," concludes Robert Satloff, "the 
roadmap fails to live up to claims to reflect lessons learned from the 
Aug. 27, 2003, at Al. 
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1993 Oslo peace accords."182 
Some commentators in Lessons of Failure and elsewhere have 
come to the conclusion that the next step in the Oslo process should 
be imposition of a final agreement. One of the most prominent recent 
exponents of such an approach is T�rje Roed-Larsen, who was one of 
the key, if not the key, initiators of the open-ended gradualism ap­
proach.183 Another recent proponent of an imposed agreement is the 
Agha/Malley team, which argues that "the parties must be presented 
with a full-fledged, non-negotiable final agreement."184 But Agha and 
Malley disagree that "a. permanent solution must await the building of 
trust between the two sides."185 They contend that " [m]istrust, enmity, 
and suspicion are the consequences of the conflict, not its cause."186 "A 
deal," they say, "should not be made dependent on preexisting mutual 
trust; the deal itself will create it." 187 But Agha and Malley fail to make 
a convincing argument for why the "full-fledged, non-negotiable 
agreement" they propose would lead to a better result than the "full­
fledged, non-negotiable agreement" offered up by President Clinton 
or the Road Map which was "presented to Israel and the Palestinians 
as a fait accompli," giving it "the dubious distinction of being the first 
u.s.-endorsed peace plan in decades that the local parties did not 
themselves negotiate." 188 As National Security Adviser Rice has 
stated, the Palestinian leadership: 
rejected a possibility of peace and a state from an Israeli Prime Minister 
who was willing to go further than anybody ever thought. Very 
strenuous efforts on the part of the United St11tes under the Clinton 
Administration, and the current Palestinian leadership couldn't find its 
way to accept that. And so opportunity after opportunity after opportu­
nity has been missed by this Palestinian leadership . . . .  1 89 
If the Palestinian leadership, and especially Yasser Arafat, is funda­
mentally unwilling to end the conflict with Israel, no imposed solution 
will be able to make that leadership take the volitional steps of per­
manently calling off and disarming the terrorists and beginning a 
genuine and irreversible process of historic reconciliation. 
Negotiations theorists tend to be skeptical of imposed solutions. 
Breakthrough warns that "a settlement that is imposed on the dispu-
1 82. Satloff, Mideast Roadmap, supra note 180. 
1 83. See Roed-Larsen, supra note 32. 
1 84. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 53. 
1 85. Id. 
1 86. Id. 
1 87. Id. 
1 88. Robert Satloff, Don 't treat the "road map" as gospel, and tread cautiously, L.A. 
TIMES, May 18, 2003, at Ml. 
1 89. Press Briefing·by National Security Advisor Dr.  Condoleeza Rice, supra note 111.  
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tants is inherently unstable" because " [o]ne or more of the contending 
parties will view the settlement as illegitimate and feel free to violate 
its terms" once they get the opportunity (p. 93) . . · 
The lead American negotiator, 'Denhis Ross; believes for similar 
reasons that imposing a peace deal oh the Israelis and Palestinians is 
"absolutely not" the right thing to do.190 "If an imposed solution were 
possible and would hold," says Ross, "I would be prepared to support 
it. But an imposed solution is an illusion."19 1  Arafat, says Ross, "would 
certainly go along with an imposed outcome. He has always preferred 
such an option. It would relieve him of the ' responsibility to make a 
decision. "192 With an imposed agreement, says Ross, Araf�t "can 
outwardly acquiesce, saying he has no choice. But inevitably, Pales­
tinians will oppose at least part of an imposed outcome," and may 
even create "newly discovered grievances" such as those that Hizbul­
lah has fabricated to create excuses to attack Israel even after Israel's 
full withdrawal from Lebanon. 193 
"If one overriding lesson from the past persists," says Ross, "it is 
that the Palestinians must make decisions and bea� the responsibility 
of those decisions. " 194 "No enduring peace can be reached," says Ross, 
"until the Palestinian leadership levels with its public, resists the temp­
tation to blame every ill on the Israelis or the outside world, assumes 
responsibility for controversial decisions, and stands by its decision in 
the face of opposition."195 In fact, says Ross, "[a]n imposed solution 
will only delay the day when all sides, but especially the Palestinians, 
have to assume real responsibilities. Consequently, an imposed solu­
tion would be no solution at all." 196 
Irrespective of what the best way forward might be, it is clear that 
open-ended gradualism did not work. Indeed, it seems to have oper­
ated to frustrate the confidence and trust it was supposed to promote. 
It is obviously impossible to say whether an Oslo process devised to 
include fewer interim steps and a greater clarity as to final status - in 
other words, with less reliance on open-ended gradualism - would 
have brought peace by now. But future peace negotiators, whether in 
this or other conflicts, should be very hesitant to repeat Oslo's 
"uniquely structured" methodological approach to peacemaking. The 
experiment failed. 
190. Ross, supra note 1 16, at 24. 
1 91 .  Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
1 94. Id. at 26. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
1700 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1661 
V. CONSTRUCTIVE AM BIGUITY 
A second key methodological aspect of the Oslo Accords that was 
meant to facilitate reconciliation but that . seems instead to have had, 
overall, the opposite effect is the Accords' extensive use of "construc­
tive ambiguity."  For the purposes of this Review, the use of "construc­
tive ambiguity" in an agreement text means the deliberate use of 
vague, equivocal, or ambiguous language which, as discussed earlier, is 
capable of being interpreted by each of the parties as protecting their 
own interests and positions.197 
A variety of commentators have complained about the extent to 
which "constructive ambiguity" was used in the Oslo Accords. Watson 
speaks of "the constructive ambiguity that plagues all of the 
Accords." 198 Manuel Hassassian complains that the Oslo "implementa­
tion mechanisms were too ambiguous and the agreement meant dif­
ferent things to each side." 199 Edward Said has described the Oslo 
Accords as "an interpreter's nightmare, a patchwork of . . .  deliberate 
ambiguities and obfuscations."200 Hanan Ashrawi has expressed her 
concern at "the gaps, ambiguities, lack of detail and absence of im­
plementation mechanisms" in the DOP.201 Ashrawi contended that the 
DOP contained so many "areas of ambiguity and friction, the agree­
ment could backfire or implode at any time."202 Israeli professor 
Aharon Kleiman, in his book, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East 
Peace-Making ("Constructive Ambiguity"), dedicates several chapters 
to the ambiguities of the various Oslo Accords. The bottom line of his 
analysis is "the post-Oslo deadlock's total predictability because of its 
inordinately strong component of 'constructive ambiguity. '  "203 
Kleiman helpfully outlines the history of reliance on constructive 
ambiguity in the Middle East conflict, " [s]tretching from the Balfour 
Declaration to the 1998 Wye River Memorandum" and beyond.204 He 
notes that a "growing penchant for papering over differences . . .  rep­
resents one major point of continuity in the long . . .  struggle for mas­
tery over Palestine. "205 
Kleiman contends that the practice of constructive ambiguity may 
have first gained wide currency during Henry Kissinger's tenure as 
197. See, e.g. , BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 37-38; KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 13. 
198. WATSON, supra note 8, at 72. 
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National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.206 Kissinger's mem­
oirs, notes Kleiman, "provide the most spirited, unabashed defense 
available anywhere of constructive ambiguity."207 Kleiman contrasts 
the Kissinger statement that "[s]ometimes the art of diplomacy is to 
keep the obvious obscured," with Kissinger's "derision for the efforts 
of his predecessor in crafting the 1969 Roger Plan of 1969 for an Arab­
Israeli settlement: 'straightforward and unambiguous, it did not get 
far. ' "208 
In Kissinger: A Biography, Walter Isaacson provides the following 
compelling description of Henry Kissinger's use of ambiguity in 
peacemaking: 
Where Kissinger's genius came into play, for better or worse, was in dis­
guising some of the concessions, fudging controversial issues, and 
wrapping it all in creative ambiguity. Some might see the purpose of a 
peace accord as being to set forth in clear terms precisely what both sides 
have accepted. Kissinger approached it from a different perspective: on 
some fundamental disputes, he purposely devised language that could 
mean one thing to one side and something else to the other.209 
A. The Benefits of Ambiguity 
Notwithstanding Kissinger's genius for it, the use of ambiguity in 
peacemaking is a double-edged sword. The following are among the 
goals (some of them overlapping at the margins) that it can help 
achieve: 
• Completely Defer the Issue to Another Day: Watson argues that 
the use of "deliberate ambiguity" in the Oslo Accords "allowed 
the parties to focus on those matters on which they could readily 
agree and to defer on those which they could not. . . .  [T]he Oslo 
Accords demonstrate that it can be a useful tool for isolating and 
defusing deal-breakers."210 Bilder emphasizes that "equivocal or 
ambiguous language can be particularly useful in helping the par­
ties to bridge disagreements as to minor or more peripheral pro­
visions of a proposed arrangement. "21 1 He notes that "nations 
often use equivocal language to bypass such peripheral issues, 
leaving them to later negotiation should they arise and their solu­
tion prove necessary."212 Entirely bypassing an issue is a job for 
206. Id. at 29. 
207. Id. at 30. 
208. Id. at 32. 
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exceptionally ambiguous language, and/or studied silence re­
garding the contentious issue. The question of Palestinian state­
hood, which was far from a minor or peripheral issue, was han­
dled more or less this way in the Oslo Accords. Only a few vague 
references, such as those to "mutual legitimate and political 
rights,'' even hinted at the existence of the question of whether 
the Oslo process would result in Palestinian statehood. 
• Establish Basis for Continued Negotiation of the Issue: On occa­
sion, negotiators do not wish to completely ignore an issue or 
wholly defer it to an unspecified future date. Instead, the negotia­
tors wish to reference the issue in the agreement pending before 
them while keeping the issue from preventing closure on that 
agreement. They can achieve this with a provision specifically 
committing the parties to negotiate the issue within a different 
framework or at some future time. Richard Bilder notes that even 
where the parties cannot reach any common understanding as to 
an issue, ambiguous language "permits them at least to commit 
themselves to cooperative approaches to the problem."213 Simply 
including an issue i.n a written agreement, says Bilder, can help 
establish a basis for further negotiation, including perhaps "an 
institutional framework and negotiating parameters in which a 
more genuine agreement can, over time, be more easily 
achieved."214 This is more or less what the Oslo framers did in 
agreeing to eventually engage in permanent-status negotiations to 
"cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settle­
ments, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation 
with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."215 
While a procedural framework was established for negotiating 
the specified "remaining issues,'' its substantive result was kept 
almost entirely open-ended. 
• Enable a Provision to Be Flexible: "Flexible" provisions are able 
to bend in meaning to match changed needs and circumstances. 
Negotiators wishing to create flexible provisions will turn to 
ambiguous language because "excessive specificity in an agree­
ment may lead to undesirable rigidity in application of the 
agreement and an inability of the parties to adjust their arrange­
ment readily to changing circumstances."216 Even very ambiguous 
language can be valuable in documents such as constitutions 
which are meant to be flexible. This is especially so where the 
213. Id. at 39. 
214. Id. 
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authority to interpret and reinterpret the document is definitively 
vested in a specific institution, such as a supreme court. 
• Mute Domestic Opposition: "Domestically," notes Kleiman, 
constructive ambiguity "avoids confronting one's opponents at 
home and being charged with weakness, with capitulation or with 
betraying the cause."217 
B.  The Risks of Ambiguity 
The benefits of reliance on "constructive ambiguity" are accompa­
nied by various risks, including the following: 
• Harder to Hold Party to Less Clear Commitment: Generally 
speaking, the more vaguely a commitment is phrased, the harder 
it is to hold a party to it. If a nation "believes that its obligation is 
ambiguous or uncertain," says Bilder, "it will see itself as in a 
better position to justify or excuse nonperformance or inadequate 
performance and to resist any application of sanctions."218 Vaguer 
texts are more open to what Franck calls "self-serving exculpa­
tory definitions. "219 A party ·can more readily deny that a particu­
lar action constituted a violation of a vaguely phrased commit­
ment, and know that the uncertainty as to the violated 
commitment's meaning may reduce the responses to the viola­
tion.220 Bilder therefore recommends that a nation which is con­
cerned that another nation will not adequately perform its obliga­
tions under an agreement should "seek to describe the 
performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely 
as possible in the agreement."221 For this reason, say Chayes and 
Chayes, the United States has in the arms control field "opted for 
increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce 
interpretive leeway."222 They note that the Strategic Arms Reduc­
tion Treaty signed in 1989 "is the size of a telephone book."223 
• Creates False Sense that Issue Is Resolved: Professor Bilder cau­
tions that using constructively ambiguous language to paper over 
a failure to reach agreement on a particular issue can "relax the 
pressure on the parties to reach an agreement capable of really 
dealing with the problem involved, induce false public expecta-
217. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 137. 
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tions, and, when these expectations are disappointed, lead to 
increased conflict and more difficulty in reaching real agree­
ment. "224 
• Fosters False Sense of What Has Been Gained and Conceded: 
Including ambiguous language in an agreement can foster not 
only a false sense that an issue is no longer of concern because it 
has been resolved; it can also foster dangerous misconceptions of 
what has been gained or conceded in an agreement. Professor 
Kleiman speaks disparagingly of "ambiguity's employment as a 
tool for deception in domestic politics, where it leads an un­
knowing public to believe hard commitments have been extracted 
from the enemy in return for soft concessions, or none at 
all . . . .  "225 Such a deception of a party's own domestic public is, of 
course, particularly pronounced when ambiguous language in the 
agreement is given a more specific meaning elsewhere, such as in 
a secret side letter. 
• Increases Dependence on Third Party: Using constructively 
ambiguous language to paper over failures to reach agreement 
can increase dependence on a third-party "honest broker" who 
becomes "indispensable" both for "stepping forward with vacu­
ous but face-saving terminology"226 and for helping the parties re­
solve subsequent disputes over the meaning of the ambiguous 
language. 
• Sets Stage for Later Disagreement Between Parties: Professor 
Kleiman uses particularly strong language to warn of the danger 
of "deferred confrontation. "227 He contends that "by leaving core 
values, issues or interests vague and unsettled," the use of am­
biguous language with respect to central issues "is guaranteed to 
be the source for later difficulties."228 This danger is particularly 
pronounced where relations become so bad that parties try to 
stretch interpretations of ambiguous language recklessly far in fa­
vor of their own interests. 
• Feeds Disrespect for the Agreement: Because human beings have 
a tendency to generalize from the particular to the whole, using 
ambiguous language to paper over disagreements in one area can 
risk undermining the legitimacy of other parts of the agreement. 
Parties that get in the habit of stretching ambiguous provisions 
may start trying to stretch clearer provisions. Commentators and 
224. BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 38-39. 
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other citizens who become aware of particular holes in an agree­
ment may begin to assume the entire agreement is riddled with 
holes. As Louis Henkin notes of another peace agreement, "any 
doubt cast on the legal validity of any of the provisions would cast 
doubt on the whole. "229 Professor Kleiman writes, in his analysis 
of ambiguity in the Oslo Accords, that " (t]he idea that Arab­
Jewish understanding might be promoted by willfully perpetuat­
ing misunderstanding defies logic."230 " (W]here," he asks, "do ar­
tifice and deception in treaty drafting leave reconciliation in the 
deeper sense of a true meeting of the minds?"231 "How," he con­
tinues, "can intentional ambiguity be reconciled with calls for 
transparency, candor and commitment in international rela­
tions?"232 
It is worth noting that the use of ambiguity can create confusion, 
not only between the parties and amongst their respective publics, but 
in the minds of the negotiators as well. George Orwell warned of the 
danger in his 1946 essay entitled "Politics and the English Language." 
Orwell warned that the use of "euphemism, question-begging and 
sheer cloudy vagueness" is dangerous in part because it "anaesthetizes 
a portion of one's brain." Vagueness, said Orwell, is a "continuous 
temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow," which is 
surrendered to at the cost of creating confusion, "not only for your 
reader but for yourself."233 
If many of the words and phrases in the Accords, and especially 
the seminal DOP, seem ambiguous to international law experts like 
Watson and others assessing them at their leisure in the light of expe­
rience and with vast scholarly resources at hand, there was surely 
enormous opportunity for the Palestinian negotiating team at Oslo to 
be either unclear or mistaken as to the agreement's meaning. Joel 
Singer, an experienced international lawyer, arrived in Oslo partway 
through the negotiations to join the Israeli delegation as their legal 
adviser. The Palestinian delegation chose not to have a legal adviser 
on their negotiating team. In his book Through Secret Channels, 
Mahmoud Abbas ("Abu Mazen"), the senior PLO leader who signed 
the DOP on behalf of the Palestinians, writes as follows: 
I must admit that throughout the Oslo negotiations we 'did not review the 
texts with a legal consultant for fear of leaks . . . .  I tried to make use of 
229. HENKIN, supra note 40, at 80. 
230. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 136. 
231. Id. at 117. 
232. Id. 
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the remnants of the legal knowledge I had acquired while studying law at 
Damascus University, but I could not draw much comfort from them.234 
Only "when all the outstanding points of difference had been resolved 
and it had been agreed to meet in Oslo to initial the DOP" did Abbas 
summon the PLO's legal consultant, Taber Shash, from Cairo.235 Shash 
arrived in Oslo and "was met by Abu Ala who handed him the text of 
the DOP and asked him to review it and give his opinion. Shash 
studied it thoroughly, and a few hours later informed Abu Ala that it 
was a good text with no shortcomings."236 Shash then returned to 
Cairo. A few hours later, the DOP was initialed in Oslo.237 
C. A Case Study of Ambiguity in the Oslo Accords: The Palestinian 
Charter Issue 
A prototypical example of the Accords' disastrously counterpro­
ductive reliance on ambiguity involves the protracted effort to achieve 
deletion from the Palestinian National Charter (also known as the 
"Palestinian Covenant") ("PNC" or "Charter") of various objection­
able clauses, including several Charter clauses calling for the destruc­
tion of Israel. 
Yossi Ben-Aharon, former Director General of the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry, opines in Lessons of Failure that " [s]ome 25 out of 33 articles 
of that covenant" call "for the elimination of Israel. "238 Several 
Charter articles stand out as particularly inconsistent with the DOP. 
For example, Article 15 of the Charter states that "The liberation of 
Palestine . . .  aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine� "239 Arti­
cle 19 of the Charter states that " [t]he partition of Palestine in 1947, 
and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regard­
less of the passage of time. "240 Article 20 of the Charter states that 
"[c]laims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are 
incompatible with the facts of history."241 Article 21 of the Charter 
states: "The Arab Palestinian people . . .  reject all solutions which are 
substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine." Article 22 of the 
234. MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS 162 (1995). 
235. ld. at 178-79. 
236. Id. at 179. 
237. Id. at 162. 
238. Yossi Ben-Aharon, supra note 144, at 60. 
239. Palestine National .Charter (1968), available at http://www.palestine­
un.org/plo/frindex.html and http://www.palestine-net.com/politics (last visited Sept. 1 1 ,  
2003). 
240. Id. 
24 1 .  Id. 
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Charter states that the "liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist 
and imperialist presence: "242 
Procedures amending the Charter are specified in Article 33, which 
provides as follows: , "This Charter shall not be amended save by a 
majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Council 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization at a special session convened 
for that purpose."243 
At Oslo, the Israeli delegation insisted that the Palestinian side 
agree to eliminate those portions of the Charter that call for the de­
struction of the state of Israel. Yasser Arafat, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the PLO, responded to this request in his letter of 
September 9, 1993, to Prime Minister Rabin. Arafat first stated that 
"The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace 
and security." Then, at the end of the letter, he stated: 
[T]he PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which 
deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are 
inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and 
no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the 
Palestinian National Council for formal approval the· necessary changes 
in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.244 
Arafat's statement contains several ambiguities, including: 
1) Which specific provisions are included in his reference to "those 
articles . . .  which deny Israel's right to exist" and "the provi-
sions . . .  which are inconsistent with the commitments of" the let-
ter? No list of affected provisions was provided. 
2) What exactly are the "necessary changes" in regard to the 
Charter? No new draft or list of necessary changes was provided. 
3) Since the Charter, by its own terms, cannot be amended except by 
a two-thirds vote of the PNC, what is the legal significance of an 
Arafat letter stating that the PLO "affirms" that certain articles 
"are now inoperative and no longer valid"? 
4) What is the legal significance of the rather loose formulation that 
"the PLO undertakes to submit" the necessary changes to the 
PNC? It is not hard to imagine alternative formulations that 
would have provided much greater clarity. For example, "the 
PLO will immediately submit" would have bound the time within 
which the commitment was to be carried out. An addition to the 
end of the second sentence of a phrase like "and will take all nec­
essary steps to advocate for and secure such approval" would 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
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have committed the PLO to doing more than simply submitting 
the necessary changes. 
5) What is the meaning of Arafat's reference to "formal approval" 
by the PNC of "the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian 
Covenant"? Again, it is not hard to imagine on alternative for­
mulation that would have provided much greater clarity. For ex­
ample, Arafat's letter could have referred to "formal amendment 
of the Covenant by a 2/3 vote of the Council so that a new Cove­
nant text is created which no longer contains the specified provi­
sions which deny Israel's right to exist or which are inconsistent 
with the commitments of this letter." 
The ambiguously worded Charter commitment in Arafat's Sep­
tember 9, 1993, letter turned out to be the first step in a game, of 
which Abbott and Costello would have been proud, that went as 
follows: 1) the Palestinians would claim to have performed their 
Charter-revision obligation, then 2) the Israelis would claim that the 
Palestinian act in question had not satisfied the obligation, then 3) the 
parties would agree on a revised but still ambiguous expression of the 
Palestinian commitment, followed by 1) then 2) then 3) and then 1) 
again and so forth. At each stage, the Palestinians would claim that the 
newly agreed formulation was the most to which they could commit. 
Some have posited that the Israelis may, at times, not have pushed as 
hard as they might have for a new Charter text out of concern that it 
might end up containing newly offensive, but perhaps harder to object 
to, provisions such as a declaration of Jerusalem as the future capital 
of Palestine. Whatever benefits the parties hoped to gain from the 
ambiguities they agreed to, the net effect was to make a mockery of 
the Oslo process and the Accords. 
" [L]ittle progress was made towards amending the" Charter during 
the two years following the signing of the DOP.245 In response to 
Israeli dissatisfaction with this lack of progress, a new version of the 
Charter-revision obligation was agreed to and included at Article 
XXXI(9) of the Interim Agreement, which was signed in Washington 
on September 28, 1995.246 Unfortunately, this new provision also left 
unclear which specific provisions were to be changed, what "changes" 
to those provisions were deemed "necessary," and what the mecha­
nism would be for implementing the changes. 
By January 1996, reports Watson, Arafat - notwithstanding his 
letter to Rabin and Article XXXI(9) - "was taking the position that 
the Covenant did not need to be amended because the PNC had 
already made declarations in 1988 and 1991 recognizing Israel's right 
245. WATSON, supra note 8, at 204. 
246. See Article XXXI of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip (Sept. 28, 1995), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 366. 
May 2003] More Process than Peace 1709 
to exist and renouncing terrorism."247 In other words, Arafat was say­
ing that no "changes" were in fact "necessary." In March 1996, how­
ever, the Palestinians released a new draft Palestinian Charter con­
taining conciliatory language that at least arguably removed the 
off ending passages. 248 
The PNC met, for the first time in five years, in April 1996. It did 
not, however, adopt the March 1996 draft language, or indeed any new 
Charter language. Instead, it passed a resolution, on April 25, 1996, in 
which the PNC decided: 
l) The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended by canceling 
the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged by the 
P.L.O. and the Government of Israel 9-10 September 1993. 
2) Assigns its legal committee with the task of redrafting the 
Palestinian National Charter in order to present it to the first ses­
sion of the Palestinian central council.249 
This resolution neither created a new Charter text nor specified 
which articles were cancelled. It also did not clearly describe the proc­
ess by which a new Charter text would come into force. The ambiguity 
left many questions unresolved. For example, was the resolution 
understood to have given the legal committee a blank check to create 
a new Charter text that would come into force upon presentation to 
the first session of the Palestinian Central Council? Or would the PNC 
need to reconvene to approve the new Charter text? What would the 
Charter look like in the meantime? How would people know which 
articles had or had not been cancelled? 
As it happened, the legal committee's six-month deadline for com­
pleting a redrafted Charter "came and went."250 Benjamin Netanyahu 
succeeded Shimon Peres as Prime Minister of Israel and his new gov­
ernment "sought a renewed, more definite Palestinian commitment to 
amend" the Charter.251 Accordingly, the Note for the Record prepared 
in conjunction with the Hebron Protocol, which was signed on January 
15, 1997, contained yet another phrasing of the Charter obligation.252 
According to Watson, "this language still contained some ambigu­
ity,"253 and by autumn 1998 there was still no new Charter. And so, at 
the Netanyahu government's request, the following provision was 
247. WATSON, supra note 8, at 204. 
248. See id. at 204-05. 
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included at Article II.C.2. of the Wye River Memorandum, which was 
signed on October 23, 1998: 
PLO Charter 
The Executive Committee of the ·Palestine Liberation Organization and 
the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998 
from PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to President Clinton concerning the 
nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are 
inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the 
Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat, 
the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the 
Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the 
members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads 
of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaf­
firm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned deci­
sions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council.254 
"On returning home [from Wye], Netanyahu cited the above pro­
vision as one of the main successes of Israeli diplomacy."255 But the 
wording of the provision is in fact "singularly nebulous. "256 Kleiman 
notes that "[t]here is no explicit proviso for the PNC body as such to 
reconvene formally."257 Rather, members of the PNC were to be 
among the invitees to a meeting where those present would be asked 
to "reaffirm their support" for Executive Committee and Central 
Council decisions reaffirming the January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat 
to Clinton. There is provision neither for a majority vote of two-thirds 
of the members of the PNC nor for publication of an amended 
Charter text. 
President Clinton participated in a meeting on December 14, 1998, 
in Gaza, "attended by about 500 of an estimated 650 members of the 
Palestine National Council," at which a vote was taken, by show of 
hands, "in support of Mr. Arafat's decision to amend the charter. "258 
The next day, Prime Minister Netanyahu pronounced himself satis­
fied.259 In reporting the event, the New York Times mentioned the 
April 1996 meeting at which the PNC had addressed the issue of the 
offending Charter clauses. The Times noted that in insisting on the 
insufficiency of the April 1996 proceedings, "the Israelis [had] pointed 
254. The Wye River Memorandum (Oct. 23. 1998), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, 
at 380. 
255. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 121. 
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to the continued inclusion of the clauses in copies of the charter."260 
Unfortunately, as of March 2003, the only copies of the Charter which 
were available (at least in English) on official PA websites still con­
tained every single one of the offending clauses. After all the laboring 
over every jot and tittle of at least five different ambiguous expres­
sions of commitment, the process has apparently still not been com­
pleted. 
Indeed, on February 1, 2001, "one hundred Palestinian personali­
ties, including members of the Palestinian Authority's Executive 
Council and members of the PNC, met in Cairo under the 
chairmanship of the Speaker of the PN<;:."261 Among the resolutions 
they passed was one that maintained that the historical Palestinian 
Charter "was still in force, because the PNC had not been convened 
for the purpose of approving changes in the Covenant and, especially, 
since the legal committee that should prepare the changes had not 
been set up."262 . 
This game, played out . for all the world to see, of writing and 
rewriting this same basic commitment, which has still not been com­
pletely carried out, has wasted precious peacemaking energy. 
Dragging out this simple matter has also fed cynicism about the 
Accords and cast a shadow over the Oslo process, causing Israelis to 
doubt the Palestinian commitment to peace and fostering Palestinian 
anxieties about Israeli micromanagement of their internal processes. 
Although the Charter squabble has been a particularly egregious ex­
ample of destructive ambiguity, it is far from the only one. Ambiguous 
language has sent the Israelis and Palestinians round and round about 
Palestinian security commitments,263 the scope _and pace of Israeli re­
deployments,264 the permissibility of Israeli settlement building,265 and 
the meaning of Palestinian "safe passage" between the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip,266 among other issues. In the meantime, relatively little 
negotiating time was spent, and relatively little progress was made, on 
central, substantive permanent-status issues such as Jerusalem and 
refugees. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Review's analysis of the Oslo Accords and their failures 
reveals important lessons about what in a bilateral peace agreement's 
text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood that the par­
ties will comply with the agreement's terms. Building on Lessons of 
Failure, Oslo & International Law, and Breakthrough, this analysis 
makes clear that the Oslo process and texts failed to take advantage of 
many of the most valuable contributions that international law can 
make to successful peace negotiations. 
Some of these potential contributions were largely or entirely 
inapplicable to Oslo because of the particular characteristics of the 
parties, their histories, and their conflict. But many compliance­
maximizing tools could have been more usefully employed in the Oslo 
process and Accords. The failure to take advantage of these tools 
meant the Accords were, from the beginning, weaker than they could 
have been. That congenital weakness was compounded by the parties' 
heavy reliance on two methodological pillars - "open-ended gradu­
alism" and "constructive ambiguity" - that proved to be disastrously 
counterproductive. 
Notwithstanding the understandable skepticism of some observers, 
this Review posits that international Jaw and international agreements 
- properly deployed - can serve as useful tools for resolving con­
flicts even in many of the darkest recesses of the international jungle. 
For example, international law offers numerous formal mecha­
nisms for resolving disputes between the parties to an agreement. The 
Oslo Accords specified several such mechanisms as options to which 
the parties could turn in case of disagreement. Other provisions of the 
Accords required the parties to avail themselves of specific dispute­
resolution mechanisms in certain circumstances. But in dispute after 
dispute, the PA/PLO and Israel ignored both the optional mechanisms 
and the required mechanisms. 
International law supplies norms that can provide a useful starting 
point for, and place outer limits on, a peace negotiation and resulting 
agreement. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, some rele­
vant norms were too indeterminate to be of use, and some specific 
disputes were too freighted with emotion to be resolved through 
anything other than negotiation. But the Accords would have met with 
more success if Yasser Arafat, in particular, had adhered to the inter­
national legal norm of interpreting and performing obligations in good 
faith. 
International law also offers several means of increasing the likeli­
hood of compliance with agreements - both interim and permanent 
- by lending legitimacy to the process and the texts. Legitimacy, the 
factor which noncoercively encourages compliance with rules, is 
accorded in greater measure to agreements that are legally binding 
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than to those that are nonbinding. The Accords were legally binding, 
but not indisputably so. It is possible that the lack of clarity on this 
point may have undermined compliance. 
Another compliance-maximizing factor is the phenomenon of par­
ties choosing to obey a rule, despite the fact that violating it would 
bring certain short-term gains, because they expect that their long­
term benefits from the future operation of the same norm will out­
weigh the short-term gains. This phenomenon was inevitably less 
applicable to the Oslo Accords because of the characteristics of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike with many international agree­
ments, the obligations which the two parties undertook in the Oslo 
Accords needed in many cases to be very different. But there seems to 
have been little or no conscious effort to maximize the similarity of 
those obligations that could be made similar. 
The Oslo Accords also could have, but did not, specify the costs or 
consequences of violations. The lack of such provisions may have con­
tributed to the Accords' failure to deter violations. The Oslo Accords 
also failed to foster the creation of vested material interests in compli­
ance. Economic interests, which could have been given more attention 
in the Accords, were instead treated as an afterthought. 
· Even though almost all recent scholarship on compliance with 
international law has been focused on multilateral agreements (and 
particularly those which are nonbinding), some of the theories that 
have emerged from this literature can also be useful for promoting 
compliance with bilateral peace agreements. For example, some 
scholars have identified a belief in the long-term benefits of participa­
tion in the international community as a motivating force for compli­
ance. The Oslo Accords might have derived greater benefit from this 
principle if the parties, which had been relatively isolated from - and 
thus were skeptical of - the international community, had been ad­
vised of specific international communal benefits they would receive 
following a resolution of their conflict. 
Instead of finding ways to benefit from the aforementioned com­
pliance-maximizing tools, the framers of the Oslo Accords relied 
heavily on "open-ended gradualism" and "constructive ambiguity" in 
crafting their agreements. The logic behind "open-ended gradualism" 
was to defer issues that were hard to resolve in the hope that gradually 
intensifying cooperation between the two sides, and progressively 
increasing the concessions of each to the other, would build sufficient 
trust to enable later compromises. 
But the Accords' open-endedness as to final status arrangements 
enabled both sides' leaders to create dangerous expectations by 
promising their people unattainable results, fed each party's concerns 
about the other's good faith, deprived both sides' leaders of a vision of 
the future to sell to their people, left the process hostage to extremists, 
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and encouraged the parties to unilaterally improve their positions on 
the ground for the final negotiations. 
Gradualism meant almost continual negotiations. These diverted 
policy analysis resources from permanent-status issues to incremental 
changes, and created business-sapping uncertainty. Public skepticism 
was increased by minor interim agreements that seemed to change 
nothing, friction between the two leaderships was fed by missed 
deadlines, and changing obligations meant the Accords were unable to 
benefit from the compliance-promoting efficiencies of routinization. 
The Oslo framers' extensive reliance on "constructive ambiguity" 
to paper over differences also seemed to create more problems than it 
solved. For example, it induced false public expectations as to what 
had been resolved and fostered dangerous misconceptions as to what 
had been gained or conceded. Tensions caused by ambiguity in certain 
areas (such as Charter revision) wasted valuable negotiating energy 
and undermined the perceived legitimacy of the agreement as a whole. 
It is impossible to say whether an improved Oslo process and texts 
would have brought peace. But it seems likely that agreements which 
made better use of the aforementioned compliance-maximizing tools 
would have had a stronger claim to legitimacy and therefore would 
have less quickly lost their ability to inspire compliance. International 
law's potential contributions to international agreements, including 
peace agreements, are just that, potential. They must be consciously 
harnessed. There has been very little discussion in either legal scholar­
ship or the policy community of what in a bilateral peace agreement 
text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood that the par­
ties will comply with the agreement's terms. The Oslo Accords have 
thus far bought more process than peace. Many other intranational 
conflicts also remain unresolved, with a bloody trail of failed peace 
agreements left in their wake. If paper is going to serve as a worthy al­
ternative to power in the international arena, much more attention 
must be given to the art of crafting a peace agreement so as to maxi­
mize the likelihood that the parties to it will comply with its terms. 
